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Abstract: One aim of consolidation after the crisis on the taxation side is to curb 
growth as little as possible. Economic literature suggests that some tax systems are 
more conducive to growth, in particular those relying on consumption, 
environmental and property taxation. This paper reflects on behavioural responses 
of economic agents to taxation and reviews the literature on the impact of tax 
structures on growth. Furthermore, it analyses the tax structure in the EU-27 
Member States and assess if the crises has triggered a move towards tax systems 
more conducive to growth. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
The massive and unprecedented fiscal interventions and fiscal stimulus packages to fight 
the economic and financial crisis have left large strains on the public finances of the EU 
Member States. In 2009, EU wide deficit peaked at 6.8% of GDP (up from 0.8% of GDP 
before the crisis), staying at a similar level in 2010 (6.4% of GDP) before slightly 
declining. Public debt is projected to increase continuously from 59 % of GDP in 2007 to 
83.3% in 2012. This surge in government deficits and debts calls on governments to 
devise credible fiscal exit strategies. Although there is evidence that consolidation effects 
on the spending side are more effective than those on the revenue side, the magnitude at 
stake suggests that a contribution of taxation may be inevitable. 
Europe's aim is to prosper as a greener, knowledge-based economy, growing fast and 
sustainably, creating high levels of employment, and to shape tax systems as to achieve 
these goals in line with the EU 2020 strategy. In the framework of the European 
Semester the important role of taxation for consolidation and sustainable growth was laid 
down in the Annual Growth Survey in January 2011 and confirmed in the Euro Plus Pact 
in March 2011.
2 Hence, the current economic, budgetary and political situation both 
offers an opportunity and stresses the need for rethinking the 'quality of tax systems'. 
Undoubtedly, tax policies pursue many policy objectives, which create trade-offs. 
Taxation serves to raise the necessary funds for public expenditure, to redistribute 
income (progressive income taxation), to stabilise the economy, to address externalities 
(environmental taxes, taxes on alcohol and tobacco), and to influence the allocation of 
resources. At the same time, taxes should not be distortive for economic growth. Given 
these various dimensions of taxation, it is evident that 'quality of taxation' is a multi-
faceted concept. 
The concept of 'quality of taxation' deals with the design of tax policy and tax systems to 
achieve desired policy objectives (redistribution, allocation, stabilisation, etc.) in the 
most efficient way - that is by minimising undesired distortions, promoting growth, and 
minimising the cost of tax collection. As economic growth is usually considered as a 
precondition for the general improvement of living conditions, the focus of the 
discussion on the quality of taxation in this paper is on the effects on GDP and on long-
term and sustainable growth. For any given level of taxation various economic outcomes 
can be obtained depending on the way a tax system is designed in terms of tax structure, 
the individual tax design and the interaction between the different tax instruments. 
 
2 European Commission (2011a) and Heads of state of the Euro area (2011) The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2 gives a short theoretical 
overview of how taxation can affect the level of GDP and GDP growth. It examines how 
the structure of taxation by main types of taxes can be made more growth-friendly. 
Chapter 3 then sets the theoretical arguments into perspective by reviewing recent 
empirical findings of simulation and estimation techniques. As the reviewed literature 
stresses the importance of the structure of taxation for growth, chapter 4 analyses the tax 
structure in EU Member States and the observed shifts in the tax structure in the recent 
past. It extends earlier work on tax shifts by the OECD in three ways: The focus on the 
EU allows interesting insights into EU similarities/differences, and convergences or 
divergences. The focus on tax categories according to economic function allows for an 
analysis of the tax burden on consumption, labour and capital in a comparable 
framework, irrespective of their purely statistical classification.
3 Furthermore, as 
environmental issues are high on both the EU and OECD agenda and environmental 
taxes are considered to remedy market failure, a special focus is put on environmental tax 
shifts. Chapter 5 assesses whether increasingly shifts towards growth-friendly systems 
have been observed since the beginning of the crisis. Section 6 concludes. It should be 
noted that this paper refrains from the assessment of the impact of tax systems on 
redistribution or poverty. While important issues, they go beyond the scope of this paper. 
2.  TAXATION AND GROWTH: OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 
Economic theory links taxation to growth through its influence on the decisions of 
economic agents. Stiglitz (1999) distinguishes non-distortionary taxation, where 
individuals cannot alter their tax liabilities, from distortionary taxation, where individuals 
take action in order to reduce tax liabilities. Hence, taxation – at least theoretically - 
changes economic decisions and can thereby affect economic growth. Considering a 
simple production function (equation 1) it is obvious that taxation can affect GDP and 
economic growth through its impact on i) physical capital ii) human capital and iii) 
through its effect on the total factor productivity (TFP).  
Equation 1:    ) , , ( A L K F Y =
where K denotes physical capital, L denotes labour and A represents the state of 
technology, i.e. the total factor productivity. As explained in more detail further on, a tax 
on labour might impact on labour market and educational decisions (L) as it makes work 
less profitable. Taxation of capital reduces incentives to save and invest, i.e. the 
accumulation of physical capital (K), and taxation of research and development might 
curb technological developments, by making these activities less profitable (A). While in 
3 
 
                                                 
3 European Commission (2011b) provides taxation on economic function according to a common 
methodology for the tax categories consumption, labour and capital 4 
 
                                                
exogenous growth models taxation can affect the steady state level of income per capita 
and its short-term growth rate on the transitional path, in endogenous growth models 
taxation can actually alter the long-run growth rate.
 4  
The following paragraphs try to give some indications on how taxation might influence 
growth relevant decisions. The focus of the analysis is on tax categories namely on the 
categories labour, capital, consumption, property and environment. The overall impact 
on employment, GDP and growth is, however, also crucially determined by the 
composition and the quality of public expenditure, the exact design of individual taxes, 
and the interaction of taxation across jurisdiction borders which will be touched upon in 
sections 2.6 and 2.7. 
2.1.  Taxes on labour  
Taxes on labour (i.e. personal income taxes, payroll taxes and social security 
contributions) can affect decisions in three major ways by altering: i) the allocation of 
time between labour and leisure ii) human capital accumulation iii) occupational and 
entrepreneurial behaviour and choices.
5 In particular,  labour taxes can affect labour 
supply decisions, both concerning the decision to participate in the labour market 
(extensive margin) and the amount of hours worked (intensive margin). However, the 
exact effect of taxation on labour supply can theoretically not be determined as the 
substitution effect and the income effect work in opposite directions. While the 
substitution effect would make people work less, "substituting work for leisure", the 
income effect leads individuals to work more in order to maintain the same income.
6 
Economic theory also indicates that the exact impact of labour taxes on the labour market 
depends on the labour demand elasticity, the degree of centralisation of the wage 
bargaining and the distribution of incomes among different income levels.
7 
Additionally, labour taxes, in particular progressive taxes, may affect the decision to 
undergo additional education and training (human capital formation), because they 
change future returns to education and training. As discussed in Woehlbier (2002), 
progressive taxation reduces the return to human capital formation - which takes the form 
 
4 Myles (2009a) reviews different production functions – which are also referred to as growth accounting 
models - and effects of taxation on GDP and economic growth. 
5 This classification is suggested based on Meghir and Phillips (2010), Myles (2009c) and Bocconi 
University (2011).  
6 Empirics has shown that men's labour supply decision is quite inelastic to tax changes, while women and 
low income earners are more responsive (see Bocconi University (2011) for a review of empirical 
literature). 
7 For details on these aspects see Meghir and Phillips (2010) or Bocconi University (2011) 5 
 
                                                
of higher future income - by a larger amount than it reduces the costs. These costs consist 
to a large extent of foregone earnings but also of other, partly not tax deductible expenses 
for education and training. Hence, the net present value of the investment in education 
and training is reduced. 
Johansson et al (2008) point out that, to the extent that labour taxes affect the relative 
price of capital and labour, this could lead to a reallocation of inputs, possibly lowering 
the efficiency in the use of production inputs.
8 This implies that the exact 
incentive/disincentive effects of labour taxation depend also on the tax treatment of 
alternative investment forms. 
As reviewed in Myles (2009c) income taxes (both corporate income taxes and personal 
income tax) can influence the choice to engage in entrepreneurial activity, due to changes 
in the risk-return profile related to it. On one hand, taxes reduce the income of successful 
entrepreneurs, which might deter risk-avers individuals from entrepreneurial activity. On 
the other hand, if losses are deductible on other income, the risk of entrepreneurship is 
shared with the state. However, if the income tax system is progressive, or of there are 
limits to loss offset, losses can only be offset at lower rates than profits are taxed. As 
such non-linearities lower the expected after-tax return from taking risk, they might 
discourage entrepreneurship.
9 As the risk-return profile is changed by income taxation – 
even more in the case of progressive taxation – this affects the choice between 
employment and entrepreneurial activity and the risk taken in entrepreneurial activity. As 
the return on (risky) innovation is changed, this might reduce the investment in R&D as 
well as human capital formation, impacting on long-term growth. 
Moreover, varying scope for tax evasion/avoidance across occupations might alter 
occupational choices. Bocconi University (2011) stresses that high marginal income 
taxes can not only bias the compensation packages towards less taxed items but may also 
distort occupational choices towards those, where tax avoidance is easier. Hence, taxes 
on labour not only affect short-term decision making, but also life-cycle decisions. 
2.2.  Taxes on capital 
Taxes on capital - such as business profits, capital gains, dividends and interests - can 
influence the rate of capital accumulation. By changing the return on capital, they might 
discourage saving and investment by economic agents (firms or individuals); hence 
 
8 According to the production efficiency theorem by Diamond and Mirrlees "Whatever the government 
could do with a distortionary tax on producers, it could do better with a direct tax on consumers that 
maintained the economy on the production possibilities schedule." cited after Stiglitz (1999, p. 569) 
9 De Mooij and Nicodème (2007) 6 
 
                                                
capital taxes alter the intertemporal allocation of resources. Lower levels of investment 
eventually lower the capital stock which in turn impacts on growth. Thus, due to the 
intertemporal structure capital taxation accumulates the distortions over time.  
In the light of these distortions
10 several authors (e.g. Judd (1985), Chamely (1986) and 
Jones et al (1997)) state that the capital income taxes should be zero in the long run for 
an exogenous level of public expenditure – also in a closed economy. Considering a 
small open economy and assuming perfect capital mobility the finding that the optimal 
tax rate on capital is zero even dates back to the 1950s (Samuelson (1954) and Tiebout 
(1956)). This finding was reinforced by Gordon (1986) and Razin and Sadka (1991), 
specifying that "in the absence of location-specific rents a small open economy should 
not levy any source-based taxes on capital."
11 They argue that due to the outflow of 
capital and hence the lower capital intensity of production, productivity in the less 
mobile factors will also fall. This drop in productivity could be avoided by taxing 
immobile factors directly instead of taxing capital, which then affects the other input 
factors.  
As outlined by Sørensen (2007) later models, introducing uncertainty in labour markets, 
or models allowing for complementarities between leisure and future consumption 
indicate, however, that a positive capital income tax would be optimal. 
The fact that despite growing capital mobility capital income taxes, and in particular 
source-based capital income taxes, still exist in the real world has given rise to further 
explanations 
12 for the existence of source-based capital income taxes: 
i)  The existence of location-specific rents: While capital taxes on normal returns 
introduce distortions, capital taxes on rents will not induce capital flight, as long as these 
location-specific rents from e.g. agglomeration are not wiped out.  
ii) Imperfect capital mobility: Capital is less mobile than suggested by the literature due 
to the cost associated with adjusting the capital and a certain home-bias in investor's 
portfolios.  
iii) Reducing distortions of personal income taxes: The existence of personal income 
taxes might induce a bias towards investment in financial capital by discouraging human 
capital investment. In addition they might induce entrepreneurs to shift labour income to 
 
10 The distortions become infinitely large in the underlying standard Ramsey infinite horizon model. 
11 Cited after Sørensen (2007) p.177  
12 See e.g. De Mooij and Ederveen (2005), Nicodème (2008) and Sørensen (2007) for more details on the 
main justifications. 7 
 
                                                
capital income to avoid taxes. Thus capital taxes work as a backstop to personal income 
taxes and alleviate distortions on human capital formation. 
iv) The benefit principle: The benefit principle argues that to the extent that companies 
consume public goods, they should pay for it. As there is no direct link between these 
services and the corporate taxation, other forms of payment might however better 
correspond to the benefit principle. 
In a world of increased international capital mobility, and in particular in an integrated 
market such as the European Union, source-based corporate income taxes may impact on 
growth on different levels. Leaving aside other factors, such as country's regulatory 
framework with respect to the tax base or administration, the corporate tax system can 
affect (i) where firms choose to locate their investment, (ii) how much they invest, and 
(iii) where they choose to locate their profits. Research predicts that the average effective 
tax rate in different countries might influence the first decision, the marginal effective tax 
rate the second, and the statutory tax rate the third.
13  
The tax treatment of capital gains as well as other returns to capital such as interests and 
dividends  can distort companies' financing decisions.  Most of the EU corporate tax 
systems are characterised by the deductibility of interest payments, while dividend 
payments do not reduce the tax base. Due to this tax discrimination companies might 
favour debt financing over equity financing for their investments (De Mooij and 
Ederveen (2005)). This not only favours companies with access to debt financing – 
usually older and less innovative firms -, but also leads to high leverage ratios. High 
leverage ratios make companies more vulnerable to financial market fluctuations, which 
together with reduced innovation activities might ultimately impact on growth. 
Moreover, capital gains taxes which are levied upon realization can also hinder efficient 
reallocation of capital. Economic agents might be locked-in in existing corporations with 
possibly inefficient investments trying to avoid capital gains taxes levied on realisation. 
Thus, by limiting the access to finance, the entrance of new, potentially more productive 
firms is curbed. 
2.3.   Consumption Taxes  
Consumption taxes – mainly value added tax (VAT) and excise duties - are often 
regarded as less distortionary than income taxes, as they do not distort intertemporal 
decisions the way income taxes do. Consumption taxes fall partly on accumulated assets, 
 
13 See Nicodeme (2008) for further details. 8 
 
                                                
which are an inelastic tax base. Moreover, consumption taxes do not impact on the 
returns to saving and, usually, do not have a progressive tax structure
14. 
As stated by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)
15 and recently stressed by Crawford et al 
(2009), in terms of their impact on individuals’ budget constraints and hence on their 
behaviour there should be no difference between a uniform tax on consumption and a 
uniform tax on wage, and (cash–flow) profit income. Hence, a wage (plus inheritance) 
tax and a consumption (plus bequest) tax are equivalent. Therefore, Crawford et al 
(2009) conclude that a shift from wage to consumption taxation has no impact on labour 
supply. Any positive employment and growth effects rather stem from the alleviation of 
distortions inherent in the labour market, or the effect on the real value of other sources 
and uses of funds
16. Moreover, different compliance cost and administrative cost issues 
between labour and consumption taxes might also contribute to efficiency gains when 
shifting from labour to consumption taxation. 
Taxes on goods and services allow for taxing different components of consumption at 
different rates. In a seminal 1927 contribution, Ramsey suggested a system of 
differentiated commodity taxation to distort consumers' behaviour as little as possible. 
His 'inverse elasticity rule' depends on the price elasticity of goods and services and 
suggests high taxes on commodities with low price elasticities. When the price elasticity 
is low, even large price hikes would not reduce demand significantly, i.e. goods are 
consumed irrespective of the price. Hence, levying a consumption tax on these goods 
would not alter consumers' behaviour significantly. In contrast, the consumption tax on 
very price elastic goods should be rather low in an efficient tax system, as they might 
distort behaviour.  
Later research – still based on tax differentiation – favours taxing complements to leisure 
highest to make them unattractive as compared to work (Corlett-Hague, 1953). More 
recently, Kleven et al (2000), and Kleven (2004) specify that there might be a case for 
taxing consumption that uses little household time – or even saves time – less heavily 
than other leisure commodities. High taxation makes it expensive to buy these services 
on the market and renders it more attractive to 'do-it-yourself'. The incentive to spend 
time on DIY activities is highest for individuals facing high marginal tax rates, i.e highly 
skilled high income individuals. Lower taxation of these substitutes for self supply, such 
 
14 As explained by Stiglitz (1999), a more progressive tax results in a greater deadweight loss, and is hence 
less efficient than a proportional tax. Here, efficiency is defined with respect to revenue, as for any 
given effect on utility, the progressive tax yields lower revenue than a proportional tax. 
15 As in Stiglitz (1999) 
16 According to Crawford et al (2009) an increase in commodity taxation would decrease the real value of 
social benefits, and hence possibly increase labour supply. 9 
 
                                                
as child care, or restaurant services, might encourage people to spend (more productive) 
time in the labour market instead of producing these services themselves. 
Kleven (2004) also claims that, goods which are conducive to health should be taxed at 
lower rates. These healthy goods might save time by preventing people from falling ill, 
thereby reducing time off work or even lengthening their working lives, thus positively 
impacting on growth  
While Crawford et al. (2009) confirm the theoretical point for an optimally differentiated 
rate structure, they question its practicability and the overall social gains that could be 
achieved. What usually remains from the idea of taxing different commodities differently 
in practice is some non-optimal form of VAT differentiation and excise taxes which are 
levied on specific products. 
As explained above, Kleven (2004) provides a case for higher taxation of i.a. health 
damaging goods, which may come in the form of excise duties.
17 Excise taxes are a way 
to correct for externalities (costs imposed on others) and even costs imposed to oneself in 
the case of alcohol and tobacco, which arise during production or final consumption of 
these products.
18 Hence, in the case of excise taxes the distortionary – i.e. the corrective 
– effect of taxes is welcome, mostly in the area of alcoholic drinks, tobacco products as 
well as on environmentally harmful behaviour and products. Moreover, as explained 
above higher taxation of health damaging goods – which might come in the form excise 
taxes – might increase working time. 
2.4.  Environmental taxes  
As mentioned above, environmental taxes (i.e. generally excise duties levied on 
environmentally harmful tax bases such as energy, transport and pollution/resource) aim 
at influencing consumers and producers via price incentives towards the desired – i.e. 
less environmentally harmful – behaviour. An ideal Pigouvian tax – a tax that is intended 
to correct the market outcome – should raise the private marginal costs at the level where 
it equals the social marginal cost. It takes the cost pollution imposes on others into 
account and thus internalises externalities. Hence, in a first best setting, a Pigouvian 
environmental tax would correct market distortions improving the efficiency of resource 
allocation.
19 The revenue raised could then be used to decrease distortive taxation on e.g. 
 
17 The way Kleuven (2004) argues provides reasoning for the existence of excise duties based on optimal 
tax theory – efficiency – arguments. 
18 A higher VAT rate on these products would not affect producers using these goods. 
19 See Kosonen and Nicodeme (2009) for a short discussion of the optimal Pigouvian tax rate in second-
best settings. 10 
 
                                                
labour. In the short-term, a 'double dividend' could materialise when environmental taxes 
are recycled to cut labour taxes, as they reduce environmentally harmful behaviour and 
help to decrease distortions on the labour market. 
However, more recent literature
20 points out that, given pre-existing distortions in the tax 
system, an environmental tax creates distortions itself. As the tax increases the costs of 
production, firms' investment and production decisions might change, thereby impacting 
on labour demand. If the cost increase is passed on to consumer prices, the real net wage 
of households is lowered, which might affect labour supply. Hence, the existence of a 
'double dividend' is controversial in the literature.
21 Moreover, in the long-term, an 
environmental tax should erode its tax base, resulting in lower revenues and a reduced 
double dividend. 
In contrast to regulatory instruments, environmental taxes set a price at each unit of 
pollution. They thus provide an ongoing incentive to reduce pollution at each unit and 
encourage the lowest cost abatement across polluters, as they leave the choice of 
abatement technology to the polluters. Thereby, environmental taxes might encourage 
innovation and R&D activities to develop new, less polluting technologies. This results 
in a more equal mix between a cleaner production process and end-of-pipe abatement 
measures than in the case of regulatory interventions.
22 Usually, a wide tax base (in a 
geographical sense) induces more innovation activity as the opportunities to benefit from 
the innovation, for example by selling it to others, are greater.  
2.5.  Property Taxes 
The OECD classification of property taxes comprises in this tax category recurrent taxes 
on immovable property (paid by both households and businesses), taxes on net wealth 
(paid by both households and businesses), taxes on gifts and inheritance and taxes on 
financial and capital transactions. As these taxes are obviously very heterogeneous in 
their nature, their effects on growth-relevant decision are diverse. 
Depending on the bequest motive inheritance and gift taxes are found to have different 
impacts on economic efficiency.
23 Taxation on planned bequests introduces distortions 
by discouraging capital accumulation and providing disincentives and disadvantages to 
enterprises in case of heritance. However, if inheritances are the unplanned result of a 
 
20 As reviewed by Parry and Oates (1998) 
21 For a summary of relevant literature see Kosonen and Nicodeme (2009). 
22 Compare OECD (2010) 
23 For a review see Cremer and Pestieau (2003) 11 
 
                                                
precautionary, consumption smoothing saving motive, then inheritance taxes should not 
change economic behaviour. 
Periodic taxes on wealth are considered as 'roughly analogous to a tax on capital income 
on that wealth' by Boadway et al (2009, p.776)). Accordingly, their effects on economic 
activity could also be considered as similar. Hence, as explained above these taxes might 
distort decisions to build up capital, i.e. to save and invest, which in turn impacts on 
long-term productivity. 
Taxation of immovable property is usually considered as least distortionary, because 
these taxes do not affect the decisions of economic agents to supply labour and to invest 
in human and physical capital as directly as other taxes do.
 24 Moreover, the immobility 
of the tax base is another appealing property. However, even though property might be 
immovable in the medium-term, property taxes might influence the initial location 
decision of businesses and property prices as future taxes might be priced in. Moreover, 
they are subject to introducing behavioural changes, when they fall on business property, 
affecting investment decisions and competitiveness with foreign producers. Hence, 
literature
25 suggests to use land values (value of property minus value of building) as tax 
base instead of property values, to avoid a disincentive – even for individuals – to add to 
the value of their properties.  
Taxation on financial and capital transactions is reviewed in Boadway et al (2009) as 
discouraging asset transactions and therefore hindering the efficiency of asset markets.
26 
Thus these taxes might distort investment decision by increasing firm's cost of capital or 
by discouraging share owners from share-value increasing investments.  
2.6.  Further Issues 
The above paragraphs give an overview on how taxation might influence growth via 
changing agents' behaviour. These reflections, and the taxes' possible distortions, are 
based on tax categories, i.e. they do not take into account any – sometimes quite sizeable 
– distortions that result from the exact design of individual taxes. Their details should be 




24 Compare Johansson et al. (2008) or Boadway et al (2009). 
25See e.g. Boadway et al (2009) 
26 For a theoretical and empirical analysis see also Bond et al (2004). 
27 A detailed analysis of this aspect – while likely having non-negligible effects – is outside the scope of 
the current paper.  12 
 
                                                
2.6.1.  Design of individual taxes 
The above mentioned example of deductibility of interest payments under corporate 
income tax systems in many EU causes distortions due to the exact design of the 
corporate tax system. Furthermore, while there might be a limited and contingent 
argument for VAT reduced and differentiated rates in theory and practice, they are also 
prone to tax fraud by "unproductive" relabeling activities.
28 Thus they might turn out 
costly not only in terms of lost revenues, but also with respect to growth considerations. 
Hence, in general, the literature
29 seems to support broad tax bases and low tax rates in 
order to reduce deadweight and welfare losses. A cut in inefficient reductions, exceptions 
or exemptions – the so-called tax expenditures – which might either not be economically 
justified any more or display incentives not in line with their original aims could increase 
efficiency of many tax systems. 
2.6.2.  Interactions with public expenditure and within the tax system 
Two other factors were not taken into account when assessing the distortions of taxation 
and possible effects on growth, namely the interaction with public expenditure, and the 
interaction between taxes. Barro (1990) shows that the provision of a public input even 
when financed by distortive taxation can have a beneficial effect on growth in a non-
monotonic way. In his model, only above a certain threshold the distortions imposed by 
the tax outweigh the benefit of the public good and hence curb growth. While taxes are 
necessary to finance growth-enhancing public expenditure, there might be a way to 
finance in the least distortionary manner.  
Usually, tax reforms do not only consist of changing a single tax rate, but include a 
combination of base and rate changes – in many cases of various taxes. Hence, the 
interaction between individual taxes should also be taken into account, when assessing 
growth impacts.  
2.6.3.  Tax administration and tax compliance 
Besides economic criteria, quality of taxation also needs to take into account compliance 
and administrative costs. According to Shaw et al. (2009) modern 'optimal tax theory' has 
for the most part ignored any other costs than those created by distorting people’s 
behaviour. However, one of the core problems of taxation is the information asymmetry 
between the tax administration and the taxpayer about his true ability to pay and the 
income gained. Calculating tax liabilities and ensuring that they are paid is a costly 
 
28 For a further analysis see Copenhagen Economics (2007) and Crawford et al (2009) 
29 Compare OECD (2010b) 13 
 
                                                
activity for both taxpayers and administrations. The associated compliance costs – for 
taxpayers – and administrative costs – for tax administrations – arise as soon as taxes are 
levied. While even in a world with honest taxpayers 'natural' administrative costs will 
arise, these cost increase considerably when taxpayers try to reduce their tax liabilities by 
engaging in tax planning (tax avoidance or tax evasion).
30 These activities also increase 
any 'natural' compliance costs that exist as taxpayers have to find their way through tax 
laws. Tax avoidance often goes hand in hand with the complexity of tax systems. The 
more complex a system and the harder the tax base is to determine, the more scope there 
is usually for tax avoidance.
31 Non-compliance is likely to increase tax distortions, as 
statutory tax rates and legal bases might have to be increased for the whole society as a 
result. 
2.6.4.  Political economy aspects 
The arguments presented in this chapter have important implications for policy decisions. 
Given the above observations on the degree of distortions introduced by taxes, it seems 
that some taxes – at least according to theory – should be preferred to others. It seems 
that environmental taxes, property taxes on immovable property and consumption taxes 
introduce fewer distortions than income taxation. 
In policy terms, hence a shift in the tax structure to a less distortive system might be 
supportive to growth. However, enacting tax shifts might be difficult from a political 
point of view. Literature
32 has indeed identified a status quo bias, which basically states 
that voters oppose change. Given this preference, the rationale for a reform has to be 
communicated efficiently and be understood by the electorates as necessary or welfare-
improving and fair, to improve its likelihood of success 
The timing of a tax reform has to be chosen properly not only with respect to the initial 
public finance conditions but also with respect to the time-span (or speed) of its 
implementation. An abrupt tax reform may limit the room for negotiations and hinder 
economic agents’ reactions in the short-term such as e.g. preventing the bringing forward 
of consumption in case of a VAT increase. A gradual reform allows splitting the reform 
in different chunks, such that only one group at a time is affected, which could lead to the 
acceptance of the reform of the majority.
33 Moreover, a long-term perspective with early 
announcements of tax reforms offers a stable and predictable economic environment, 
 
30 Compare Stiglitz (1999) or Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) 
31 Shaw et al (2009) 
32 For a survey see Castanheira et al (2011). 
33 Compare Castanheira et al (2011) 14 
 
                                                
which allows households and businesses to take optimal long-term decisions such as 
investment in human and physical capital. 
2.7.  EU dimension 
2.7.1.  Tax competition 
The effects taxes might have on growth do not stop at national boundaries. Given the 
high integration of the EU single market, and the high mobility of certain factors, tax 
competition and tax evasion considerations might influence policy makers' decisions. 
Assuming benevolent governments, tax competition literature
34 predicts that, without co-
ordination, governments apply tax rates on mobile factors that are inefficiently low. 
Governments mutually undercut each others' tax rates on mobile tax bases in order to 
avoid an outflow of taxable income or attract mobile bases. Due to low tax revenues, 
governments cannot provide the socially optimal level of public goods, or they tax 
immobile factors such as labour at rates above socially optimum levels to sustain overall 
tax revenues and the provision of public goods.
35  
Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2009) investigate the reaction of the domestic tax base to changes 
in the (domestic and foreign) tax rate. They show that in the long run a 1% reduction in 
the effective average domestic CIT rate leads to a less-than-proportional increase in the 
level of domestically reported corporate taxable profits, resulting in actually less tax 
revenues. Hence, to keep up revenues, countries might see themselves forced to increase 
taxes on less mobile factors to inefficiently high levels to keep the same level of public 
service provision. Huizinga et al (2008) state that tax bases are affected by tax rates (the 
weighted average of national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates) 
via debt-shifting. They find that international debt shifting serves to lower average levels of 
corporate income taxation in high-tax countries, which might introduce some dead-weight 
loss. 
Given their results, Huizinga et al (2008) and Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2009) both 
conclude that their results point towards possible gains from international tax 
cooperation/coordination. According to Riedl and Rocha-Akis a simultaneous rise in CIT 
rates across countries would result, on average, in a less-than-proportional decrease in 
the CIT base and, therefore, higher CIT revenue. 
 
34 This strand of the literature is based on the seminal models by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and 
Wilson (1986). Tax competition literature assuming Leviathan governments concludes that tax 
competition improves welfare by limiting the size of an otherwise excessive state (see Edwards and. 
Keen (1996); also for a synthesis of these two views) 
35  Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) 15 
 
                                                
In the field of energy taxation, coordination might not only avoid tax competition, but 
allow for greater social returns. As mentioned above, environmental taxation might 
encourage innovation; the greater the opportunity to benefit from this innovation, the 
greater the level of innovation. The possibility to profit from this tax induced innovation 
can be increased by widening the tax base, which could be done by reaching over 
country barriers. 
Environmental taxation imposed on companies might however also induce pollution 
intensive companies to (re)locate to countries with the lowest environmental taxation. 
This as well as the government's attempt to maintain the company's competitiveness with 
respect to foreign (less taxed) competitors might result in environmental taxation below 
the social optimum. EU wide and international coordination hence could help to build 
similar environmental standards across countries. 
On consumption taxation, in particular on VAT, Crawford et al (2009) see welfare gains 
in tax/administrative coordination. The current EU-VAT system, which is characterised 
by the zero rating of exports and the system of ‘deferred payment’ for VAT on imports 
from other EU Member States, opens the room for tax fraud by so called carousel 
trading. Improved administrative cooperation could serve as a (non-structural) remedy to 
these shortcomings in the EU VAT system.  
2.7.2.  Tax exporting 
While the above mentioned cases represent different forms of harmful tax competition, 
another aspect that deserves attention in an EU dimension is the possibility of tax 
exporting. Tax exporting refers to the shifting of tax burdens from domestic residents to 
non-residents of the taxing jurisdiction. Tax exporting is more significant the larger the 
share of non-resident producers/consumers is relative to the market size. The standard 
example given by Oates (1972), are taxes on restaurants and hotels in tourist areas, which 
are mostly paid by non-residents. Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) show that policymakers 
also have an incentive to increase capital taxes (such as corporate income taxation) if part 
of the tax incidence is on foreigners. This might lower tax rates imposed on residents in 
other areas since public services are partly financed by non-residents or alternatively an 
increased provision of public goods. Tax exporting indicates that as governments do not 
take into account the overall social costs (imposed on residents and non-residents), but 
only those on residents, the tax rate might be set above the social optimum. However, the 
overall welfare effects of tax exportation are hard to determine, as they might counteract 
welfare decreasing tax competition or tax evasion.
36 
 
36See Huizinga and Nicodeme (2006) for an empirical evaluation. 16 
 
                                                
Given the high interdependence of Member States' tax systems in the EU single market, 
cooperation at EU level could prove beneficial. As indicated above cross-border spill-
over effects induced by tax competition or tax exporting may constrain the taxing 
capacity of an individual Member State and introduce additional distortions. Moreover, 
tax cooperation can also benefit the implementation of national tax policy strategies, for 
instance when it leads to the exchange of best practices or the elimination of mismatches 
between national systems. 
3.  TAXATION AND GROWTH: OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
While presenting theoretical behavioural effects of taxes, the analysis in chapter 2 did not 
give any quantification of the effect of changes in the tax system on GDP and GDP 
growth. Hence, this chapter provides a summary of the evaluation of changes in the tax 
system based on simulations as well as on econometric estimations. 
As demonstrated above, according to economic theory, taxation – only with the 
exception of lump sum taxes – creates distortions and in turn may impact negatively on 
economic growth. Hence, looking for an optimal tax system or assessing the quality of a 
tax system, two basic questions arise. The first is on the optimal level of tax revenues, 
while the second question is how a given level of tax revenues can be raised optimally. 
At the current juncture of additional consolidation needs, these considerations could 
translate into the question on how to increase a tax system's capacities to raise revenues, 
promote growth and employment, while sustaining redistributive and allocative 
functions.  
Particularly the first question has been the focus of a large number of studies.
37 The 
results of these studies, however, are rather inconclusive with respect to providing 
evidence that a high total level of taxation impacts negatively on economic growth. 
Given that the level of taxation also presents political choices for private or public 
provision of public services, this paper will not go in detail on levels of taxation. Rather, 
it deals with the issue of how a tax system can be designed to be supportive to growth 
and employment given a certain level of tax revenues. As economic growth is usually 
considered as a precondition for the general improvement of living conditions, the focus 
of the discussion is on the effects of changes in the tax structure on GDP and long-term 
growth. 
 
37 See for a review, European Commission (2008) and Myles (2009a). 17 
 
                                                
3.1.  Simulations 
The simulation models surveyed in Myles (2009a) display different results of tax reforms 
on growth. While some do not find any significant effects from changes in the tax 
structure others refer to the existence of non-negligible effects on GDP and GDP growth. 
The effects depend on the way the government sector is modelled (including productive 
or just wasteful government spending), the degree of detail represented in modelling 
growth channels, in particular with respect to human capital accumulation and labour 
market reactions to tax cuts, and the calibrated parameters. Despite these widely varying 
outcomes for tax-reform simulations, Myles (2009a, p.44) concludes that "almost all the 
results support the claim that a move from income taxation to consumption taxation will 
raise the rate of growth even though the predicted effect may vary."  
These effects of taxes on GDP are confirmed by simulations using the European 
Commission's Quest III model
38. This New-Keynesian DSGE model
39 distinguishes 
labour taxes, consumption taxes (VAT and others) and corporate profit taxes; its 
parameters are estimated on euro area and US data. The estimation results reported in 
European Commission (2008) indicate that in the standard model
40 a budgetary neutral 
tax shift in the order of 1% of GDP from labour taxes to consumption taxes has indeed a 
positive effect on employment and GDP. The long-run effects are lager when a 
coordinated euro-area wide tax shift is considered, than in case of a unilateral tax shift, 
no matter if a small or large country performs this shift. However, in the short-run the 
gains might be larger in the case of unilateral individual country shifts due to 
competitiveness effects. The quantitative results of a coordinated shift indicate an 
increase in employment and real GDP by about 0.25% in the euro area in the long run.
41 
A similar simulation exercise with the Quest III model also including property taxes 
(taxes on housing) is reported in European Commission (2010a) and Roeger and in't Veld 
 
38 European Commission (2008) 
39 The key features of the model are 1) a fraction of households are liquidity constrained 2) prices and 
wages adjust with lags 3) monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule and 4) debt is stabilized by 
means of a gradual adjustment in labour taxes. 
40 Benefits and transfers are indexed to consumer prices in the standard model. The GDP effects are higher 
if no indexation is assumed. 
41 The Quest III simulations refer to the GDP level, not to changes in long-term growth rates, which have 
not been investigated. 18 
 
                                                
(2010). Here, the effects of a permanent reduction of the government deficit by 1% of 
GDP through different tax increases are simulated.
42 
A consolidation through an increase in consumption taxes is found to be the most 
favourable of all tax-based consolidations as regards long run GDP – while in the short 
run all tax consolidations result in GDP losses (see graph 1 below). A 1% of GDP 
consolidation achieved by raising consumption taxes would lead to an initial decline in 
GDP of 0.1-0.2 percent; in the long run GDP would be higher by 0.4-0.5 percent 
compared to the baseline scenario of no consolidation. A consolidation through 
increasing labour or property taxes would lead to stronger initial GDP losses and lower 
long-run gains. Contrastingly, an increase in corporate income taxes would lead to 
relatively small short-run losses in GDP. However, these losses build up over time as 
investment is depressed and the capital stock declines, leading to the highest GDP losses 
in the long-run. These developments are displayed in graph (1), which shows the short 
term effects of tax consolidations on GDP as lines and the long term effects on GDP for 
10, 20 and 30 years as bars. 
The larger simulated GDP effects in the more recent study are mostly the result of the 
combined consolidation with tax shifts. While the first simulation reports the effects of a 
budgetary neutral tax shift, the second simulation assumes a permanent deficit reduction 
of 1% of GDP compared to a baseline scenario. It is assumed in the model that the stock 
of outstanding debt gradually declines and that interest rates fall (risk premium) over 
time. This increased room for fiscal manoeuvre – relative to a baseline scenario – can in 
turn be used to cut tax rates; all model simulations assume a reduction in labour taxation. 
Thus, strong tax increases are only limited to the first years of the consolidation, while in 
the medium and long run labour taxation falls, impacting positively on employment and 
GDP. 
Summing up, while the effects of a pure tax shift towards less distortionary taxation 
seems to be limited, the proper design of a consolidation seems to have more sizeable 





42 The scenarios referred to assume an indexation of benefits to net after tax wages. Roeger and in't Veld 
(2010, p.24) report that alternative assumptions would increase distortions and lead to larger negative 
output effects of debt. .  
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Recently, the European Commission (2011)
43 reported on the effects of an energy tax 
reform on employment and growth. The simulations – performed by Cambridge 
Econometrics with the E3ME model
44 – assume that the additional revenues from 
increased energy taxation are recycled to reduce the employers' social security 
contributions. The impact of shifts from social security contributions to different forms 
of energy taxation on employment and GDP are reported small but positive. The impact 
gets stronger, the higher the additional energy tax revenues are assumed. This positive 
impact on GDP and employment is driven by the modelling assumption that additional 
revenue from energy taxation would be used to reduce the employers' social security 
contributions. Lower labour costs boost employment and decrease domestic price levels 
increasing private consumption. This positive impact on employment and GDP is 
confirmed by the European Commission's Quest III model, which was used to assess the 
impact of an energy tax reform taking into account the crisis.
45 
                                                 
43  European Commission (2011c): SEC(2011) 409 
44  The E3ME model of Cambridge Econometrics is a dynamic macro-econometric model designed to 
deal with E3 interactions (economy-energy-environment). It is a European model treating each 
Member State separately and keeping the rest of the world exogenous. 




Overall, the simulations reviewed generally find some positive effects of shifts from 
labour towards property, consumption and environmental taxation. The driving force in 
the simulations is usually the assumed positive impact of the tax cut on labour taxation 
on the labour market. 
3.2.  Estimations 
Empirical research is largely driven by the theoretical underpinnings that some taxes are 
more detrimental to growth than others. In his survey of empirical literature Myles 
(2009b) finds some evidence that consumption taxes are less damaging for growth than 
income taxes. However, he considers the lack of structural modelling of the estimated 
equations as a severe limitation to the interpretation of the results, and highlights that 
causality issues could not be resolved by the estimations. 
Recently, Arnold (2008), Johansson et al (2008) and Arnold et al (2011) have 
investigated the effect of the tax structure on long-run GDP, using a panel error 
correction model for 21 OECD countries over the years 1971-2004. Based on the results 
of these estimations the authors suggest a growth- friendliness ranking for tax 
instruments, which is lead by property taxes, in particular by recurrent taxes on 
immovable property, followed by consumption taxes (and other property taxes). The 
authors classify personal income taxes as inferior to these two tax instruments, and 
corporate income taxes as having the most negative effects on GDP per capita. 
Xing (2010) challenges these results. The author argues that the used Pooled Mean 
Group (PMG) estimator's assumptions might not be valid for the investigated dataset. 
The PMG estimation method assumes that the long-run relationships between variables 
are homogenous across countries and only allows for heterogeneous short-run dynamics. 
Challenging the validity of the homogeneity assumption, Xing (2010) first replicates the 
estimations by Johansson et al (2008) using slightly different specifications and 
performing robustness tests. Based on a differently specified PMG estimates, the author 
concludes that income taxes and consumption taxes are worse than property taxes. 
However, Xing (2010) does not find strong evidence for any further ranking between 
consumption taxes, personal and corporate income taxes. Relaxing the homogeneity 
assumption and using pooled OLS and the two-way Fixed Effects estimations the author 
can only confirm the results from the PMG estimations for certain groups of countries. 
Analysing the impact of labour tax reducing reforms, Bocconi University (2011) only 
finds very weak evidence for any effects on the labour market. However, focusing on 
reforms targeted to woman and those were social partners were involved show the 
expected positive impact on the labour market. 21 
 
                                                
The estimation results surveyed above might indicate that the OECD is consisting of too 
heterogeneous countries to perform this analysis. Hence, the remainder of the paper will 
focus on tax structures and changes in the EU. Based on the observations of Arnold 
(2008), Johansson et al (2008), and Arnold et al (2011) for OECD countries the 
following chapter analyses tax structures and tax shifts in the EU-27 until 2008. 
Furthermore, chapter 5 assesses if fiscal policy since the beginning of the crisis has been 
characterised by shifts from income to consumption taxation or 'green' taxation – as 
suggested by the literature reviewed above. 
4.  DEVELOPMENT IN EU MEMBER STATES
46 
4.1.  Status quo of tax burden and tax share in the EU-27 
A snapshot of the tax mix in the EU Member States is given in graph 2. It shows the 
distribution of the total tax burden according to economic function for 2009 – the latest 
year for which detailed data are available. This graph groups taxes together according to 
the function they are levied on displaying the following groups: taxes on labour 
(including social security contributions), capital (taxes on stocks of capital/wealth and 
taxes on capital and business income) and consumption (VAT and excise duties).
47 
Furthermore, as environmental issues are high on the EU agenda and environmental 
taxes are considered to remedy market failure, environmental taxes are displayed in 
graph 2.  
While the EU-27 is a high tax area on average with an average tax-to-GDP ratio of 
38.4% in 2009, there are considerable differences between old Member States (denoted 
EU-15) and new Member States (denoted EU-12). The EU-15 average tax burden 
reaches almost 39% of GDP, while the EU-12 Member States display a considerably 
lower average tax burden of 32% of GDP. As displayed in graph 2, most of the EU-15 
countries (except for Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom) are 
ranked above the EU-27 median, i.e. to the left side of the graph, while only three new 
Member States, namely Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia display an above median tax 
burden. The highest overall tax burden in 2009 was recorded in Denmark, amounting to 
above 48% of GDP whereas Latvia's tax ratio amounted to a mere 26.6% of GDP.  
 
46 Data in this chapter are based on European Commission (2011b). 
47 For further information on the derivation of the taxes according to economic function see European 
Commission (2011b). The available data categorisation deviates from the categorisation used in 
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Source: European Commission (2011b), own calculations 
As can be derived from graph 2 EU Member States also differ with respect to their tax 
mixes. The importance of labour taxes is highlighted by the fact that half of the Member 
States derive more than half of total tax revenues from taxing labour, among which ten 
old Member States. This translates into share of labour taxes in total taxation of 53% in 
EU-15 compared to 44% in the EU-12. The high share of consumption taxes in the EU-
12 of 37% of total taxation is mostly the mirror image of low labour taxation. Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Hungary and Rumania levy about 40% of taxes on 
consumption, with Bulgaria even raising 50% of total taxes on consumption. In contrast, 
consumption taxes reach a modest 27% of total taxation in the EU-15, with, Belgium, 
Spain and Italy levying less than one quarter on consumption taxes. For Italy and Spain 
the low revenues are partly due to VAT exemptions and reduced rates applied to a large 
base, as well as the low standard rate in Spain. Taxes on capital are the least important 
source of revenues for both, EU-15 at 21% and EU-12 at 19% of total taxation. The 
dispersion within the two groups are quite the same ranging from 30% in the UK to 13% 
in Sweden for the old Member States and 32% in Malta to 9% in Latvia. 
Graph 2 also gives information on environmental taxes which in principle can be levied 
on all three tax bases consumption, labour and capital. In practice, however, 
environmental taxes fall mostly on consumption, usually in the form of excise duties. 
Denmark is the only country which levies in addition a significant part of environmental 
taxes on capital, by taxes such as the 'tax on hydrocarbon' and the 'corporation tax on 




                                                
GDP on environmental taxes. Given the lower overall tax burden in the EU-12 this 
translates into a share of environmental taxation of more than 7.5% of total taxation in 
EU-12 Member States but only 6% of total taxation in EU-15 Member States. Hence, the 
tax systems of the EU-12 rely to a larger extent on environmental taxation. 
4.2.  Special focus: Environmental taxes 
As the crisis has evoked renewed policy interest in the subject of 'green tax shift', the 
paper offers some further analysis on environmental taxation.
48 The interest of policy 
makers on environmental taxes usually stems from the potential double dividend of 
environmental taxation, which has been
  reviewed in section 2.4.  
The European Commission, the OECD and the International Energy Agency (IEA) have 
agreed on a common statistical framework on environmental taxes. They define 
environmental related taxes as "any compulsory, unrequited payment to general 
government levied whose tax base is a physical unit (or proxy of it) of something that has 
a proven specific, negative impact on the environment". 
49 However, charges and fees on 
environmentally harmful tax bases are not comprised by this definition, as they present 
requited payments – i.e. there is a link between the service and the payment. Statistically, 
environmental taxes are divided into four broad categories, namely energy, transport, 
pollution and resource taxes. Value added type taxes are not included, as these taxes are 
levied on all products. 
4.2.1.  Energy taxes
50 
Energy taxes are taxes on energy products such as mineral oils, gas and electricity as 
well as CO2 taxes. They are mostly levied as excise duties per unit of physical 
consumption and usually fixed in nominal terms, implying that their real value decrease 
with inflation As graph 3 shows, they are by far the most significant environmental tax, 
representing around three quarters of environmental tax receipts. This is mostly due to 
the existence of EU legislation
51 which provides a common framework for taxing energy 
products and electricity in the EU and sets minimum tax rates.  
 
48 The EU's 2020 strategy defines the challenges that Europe is facing for the next decade, in economic, 
environmental and social areas and sets relevant priorities in terms of sustainable growth, more 
resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy. (European Commission COM (2010)) 
49  Definition as in European Commission (2001) p. 9 and p.15. 
50 This part draws partly on the sub-section on ‘Transport fuel taxes‘ in Part II.5 of the publication 
‘Taxation Trends in the European Union‘ European Commission (2009) and (2010b), which was 
originally drafted by the author and adjusted for 2009 data, based on a methodology to disentangle 
fuel tax revenues developed by the author 
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Source: European Commission (2011b), own calculations 
What becomes also evident from graph 3 is that most energy taxes are levied on transport 
fuel. The high share of taxes derived from the transport use of fuels reflects the details of 
the minimum excise tax rates set up in the Energy Tax Directive
52. Minimum tax rates 
for petrol, which is almost exclusively used for transport purposes, are the highest among 
all products covered by this Directive. On the other hand, minimum rates for heavy fuel 
oil, primarily used for heating purposes, are very low. Tax rates for product categories, 
which are used for both transport and stationary purposes, are heavily differentiated. This 
differentiation of minimum tax rates between motor fuels and fuels used for 
heating/business use reflects that the choice of the minimum excise duty rates was not 
only influenced by environmental and efficiency considerations. From an environmental 
and efficiency viewpoint taxing equally polluting substances in an equal way is 
preferable, as it also reduces administrative cost and non-compliance activities. However, 
the current choice of minimum tax rates allows Member States to take social (fairness) 
and equity considerations into account when setting tax rates, when e.g. allowing for 
lower tax rates for heating fuels.  
The predominance of transport fuel taxes is particularly striking for the new Member 
States; most of which levy around 90 % of their energy taxes on transport fuels. The high 
transport fuel shares in energy taxation in the new Member States is explained by the fact 
that they enjoy tax exemptions or at least considerably reduced rates from the minimum 
excise duty for the taxation of other products in the category energy taxes such as 





                                                
electricity and natural gas.
53 As electricity and natural gas are hardly taxed their energy 
tax revenue from any other source but mineral oil taxes is very low. 
In contrast to the new Member States, the relative importance of fuel taxes varies 
considerably across the old Member States. The band spreads from a fuel tax revenue 
share in energy taxes of above 90 % for Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal to only about 
50 % for Denmark and Sweden. The difference in the shares is due to the tax revenues on 
natural gas and electricity. While the latter two countries receive significant revenues 
from taxes on electricity and natural gas (more than 25  % of energy taxes), Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Portugal only collect negligible revenues on these items (less than 1 % 
of energy taxes). Hence, differences in the taxation of natural gas and electricity persist, 
despite the attempt to reduce differences in the level of taxation in Member States by the 
introduction of minimum tax rates on energy products and electricity in the Energy Tax 
Directive (2003/96/EC). The difference results from the choices made by the individual 
Member States. While Denmark exceeds the minimum excise duty on electricity by more 
than 180 times (Sweden still about 60 times)
54, other countries enjoy derogations for 
compliance with the minimum excise duty, reflected in zero tax rates.  
4.2.2.  Other environmental taxes 
Transport taxes mainly include taxes linked to the ownership and use of motor vehicles 
(including aeroplanes) and the services provided herewith. Hence also e.g. road taxes – 
as long as they are defined as taxes – fall under this category. They correspond on 
average, slightly less than one quarter of total environmental tax revenues and 1.4 % of 
total taxes and social contributions (in the EU-27 weighted average). The remaining two 
categories, pollution taxes and resource taxes, are usually analysed together, as their 
revenues are almost negligible. Pollution taxes comprise taxes on emissions to air, water, 
management of solid waste and noise, except for CO2 taxes. Resource taxes include any 
taxes on the extraction or use of natural resources. In contrast to energy taxes, old 
Member States levy significantly more other environmentally related taxes than new 
Member States, measured as % of total taxation. This is partly due to the lack of EU-
wide harmonisation and the tax preferences of the Member States. 
 
53 Council Directive 2004/74/EC 
54  In the Netherlands the tax rate on electricity exceeds the minimum excise duty by more than 200 
times. However, due to data limitations the revenue share of taxes on electricity in energy taxes could 
not be calculate exactly; it should be around the same magnitude as for Denmark and Sweden. 26 
 
                                                
4.2.3.  Revenue raising potential of environmental taxes 
The fact that energy products – and in particular transport fuels – are already quite 
heavily taxed compared to other environmental tax categories leads some authors 
(Fullerton et al. (2009) p. 425) to state that 'It is not obvious that environmental taxes 
have significant revenue-raising potential. Existing large-scale taxes such as excises on 
motor fuel are already near the upper limit of what can be justified by the environmental 
costs involved. Taxes on waste management represent an interesting case for reform but 
are unlikely to raise much additional revenue.' 
However, even environmental tax increases in seemingly undertaxed groups such as 
transport or pollution/resource taxes might not be possible in the short to medium term. 
Indeed, the environmentally related tax bases pollution and transport deserve particular 
attention due to numerous fees levied on theses bases. These fees are often the result of 
the replacement of taxes by fees over the last decades due to privatisation activities in the 
Member States. Taxes on transport are in many Member States complemented by fees 
falling on the same tax base such as road charges or highway tolls. However as these 
tolls are linked to some kind of service, i.e. the use of highways, they are not unrequited 
payments and hence not taxes by definition. The same argument holds for environmental 
charges levied on pollution. Usually payments for waste and sewage disposal are linked 
to a service and hence recorded as a fee – therefore they are not reflected in the data 
analysed above. Hence just looking at the tax data might underrepresent the actual 
overall burden (taxes and fees) on these bases. Given that the service – waste 
management or road use – for which usually a fee instead of (or in addition to) a tax is 
levied also contains an environmental component, much higher taxes might neither be 
socially optimal nor justified by the environmental cost involved. 
Moreover, the difference between fees and taxes might often be a statistical artefact, 
differing from country to country. Hence, the amount of taxes and fees together levied on 
a tax base might be the relevant variable to use if the economic intention is to assess the 
internalisation of externalities and to assess additional revenue raising capacities. 
In Austria, for example, taxes on transport and pollution amount to 0.8% of GDP and 
0.03% of GDP respectively. However, when charges and fees levied on these databases 
are included, the overall burden on transport increases to 1.3% of GDP and on pollution 
to 0.7% of GDP.
55 For transport taxes the increase is due to road tolls (Vignette) and the 
increase in the overall burden on pollution is the result of various charges on water (use 
of water, wastewater) and waste. This shows that while transport and pollution might 
 
55 Data on environmental fees and charges is derived from the OECD/EEA environmental database (OECD 
(2011)). 27 
 
                                                
seem undertaxed an in-depth analysis taking into account fees might draw a different 
picture. 
Thus, to judge if further burdening of these basis is economically justified by 
environmental costs involved, an assessment of the overall charges is necessary. As this 
analysis might point to limited revenue raising capacities of environmental taxes in the 
short run, the OECD (2010) considers auctioned permission permits and carbon taxes to 
offer additional revenue raising potential. 
4.3.  Development of the tax mix before the crisis 
As stressed in the previous chapters, some literature – and more and more general 
wisdom – suggests shifts from taxes on labour and capital to consumption, environmental 
and property taxes in order to promote growth and employment. We are therefore 
interested whether these shifts could be observed in the EU until the beginning of the 
crisis. A look at the recent past in the EU-27 Member States suggests that shifts towards 
taxes considered less distortive have been relatively limited so far. 
Graph 4 below displays the change of the revenue share in total taxation by economic 
function between the years 2001-2008. By its nature, this graph does not contain any 
information on the development on the overall tax to GDP ratio; this information is, 
however, displayed in graph 5. Thus, while graph 4 contains information on shifts within 
the tax system and hence displays the change in importance of the tax categories, graph 5 
shows the change in tax-to-GDP ratios for the tax categories and overall tax revenues.
56  
The years for analysing the tax shift were chosen in order to reduce possibly different 
influences from the economic cycle which could drive changes in the tax mix via the 
automatic stabilisers. Some tax bases are more prone to cyclical swings than others. In a 
favourable economic climate usually (company) profits and the wage sum increase faster 
than private consumption. Together with the progressivity of most income tax systems 
this results in a faster increase of income taxes than consumption taxes and hence a shift 
of their respective shares. The reverse applies in economic downturns. While 
consumption tax revenues remain relatively stable, income tax revenues are usually 
affected more heavily. Hence, the observed change in their respective shares in total 
taxation might just be due to cyclical developments, rather than tax policy. 
One way to reduce these influences it to compare years where similar economic 
situations were prevailing.
57 Both, 2001 and 2008, are the first years after the business 
 
56 Graph 5 is used to support the analysis performed on the basis of graph 4. 
57 Another possibility would be to use cyclically adjusted data. Cyclically adjusted data on the functional 
level is however not available. cycle peak was reached, introducing a period of lower growth. Sensitivity tests were 
performed using the years 2000-2007, which were both denoting the peak of the business 
cycle, and 2000-2008, where the output gaps were of similar magnitude. While not 
exactly identical, similar trends could be observed (see the Annex for the graphs).
58 
Moreover, it is important to recall that any change observed in the tax mix might also be 
due to the fact that the share of the tax base in GDP has changed (composition effects). 
The tax base for capital taxation, proxied by the operating surplus, increased by around 
1.5% of GDP between 2001 and 2008. The tax bases for labour and consumption taxes, 
namely compensation of employees and private consumption, remained rather stable in 
% of GDP. To get an unbiased picture, the changes in the tax mix analysed in the 
following sub-sections will be put into perspective referring to policy measures.  





































Consumption Labour (employed and non-employed) Capital (capital & business income and stocks of capital)
 
Note: Averages represent GDP weighted averages 
Source: European Commission (2011b), own calculations  
 
Strikingly, on an overall EU-27 basis (GDP weighted averages), tax mixes have basically 
remained unchanged. While the share of labour and consumption in total taxation 
decreased by 0.6 and 0.8 percentage points respectively, the capital share increased by 
roughly 1.3 percentage points.
59 Comparing developments in old and new Member 
States displays large variations. In the EU-12 the labour tax share decreased by 3.4 
percentage points, whereas the consumption tax share increased by 1.8 percentage points, 
                                                 
58 Given that 2009 was characterised by a slump in GDP, not experienced in the recent past, it was not 
used as a reference year. 





basically in line with suggestions in the literature. Contrastingly, with an increasing 
capital share and a decreasing consumption share, the EU-15 Member States have 
experienced changes opposite to recommendations in th

























Consumption Labour (employed and non-employed) Capital (capital & business income and stocks of capital) Total
 
Note: Averages represent GDP weighted averages 
Source: European Commission (2011b), own calculations 
4.3.1.  Taxation on labour 
In line with the proposals for growth enhancing tax systems, 15 Member States' tax 
systems experienced a decrease in the share of labour taxation in the 2001-2008 period. 
However, a significant decrease (more than one standard deviation) could only be 
observed in three Member States with above EU average labour tax shares (50.8%) in 
2001, namely in Germany (from 60.6% to 55.7%), Lithuania (from 53.9% to 49.3%), and 
Slovenia (from 55.8% to 51.9%). On the contrary, a couple of new Member States with 
already relatively low labour tax shares in 2001 experienced the most significant 
decrease in labour taxes. Bulgaria's labour tax share decreased by more than 10 
percentage points to 30.7% – the third lowest in the EU-27 –, and Malta's 7.7% drop in 
the labour tax share now results in the lowest share in the EU-27 at 27.7%. 
The reasons for the reduced dependency on labour taxation in all of the above mentioned 
countries but Malta are several cuts in tax rates and social security contributions. 
Bulgaria and Slovenia experienced a particularly strong decrease in social security 
contributions and payroll taxes respectively, together with considerable tax rate cuts. 
Germany saw a decrease in its tax base (proxied by compensation of employees) and cut 
PIT rates over the entire income range and Lithuania reduced its flat income tax rate. In 
Malta, the lower share can not directly be traced to significant changes in 30 
 
                                                
tax/contribution rates or tax exemptions, but rather reflects the decline in the tax base and 
the increase in capital tax revenues. 
4.3.2.  Taxation on capital 
Over the period under investigation 17 Member States faced an increase in their capital 
tax shares. Starting from an above average share in 2001 Malta displays the largest 
increase in the capital tax share (+9.2 pp). In 2008 it had the second highest capital tax 
share, just after the UK, which also increased the capital tax share over the period under 
investigation (+3.6 pp). The other countries experiencing a significant increase in capital 
tax shares, namely Lithuania (+6.1 pp), Germany (+4.0 pp) and Slovenia (+3.8pp), 
started from well below average capital shares. The countries displaying a sizable 
reduction in the capital tax share, namely the Netherlands (-4.4pp), Luxembourg (-4.3 
pp) and the Check Republic (-2.6 pp), started form at or above average capital tax shares, 
with only Luxembourg remaining above average in 2008.
60  
Capital tax data comprises tax revenues on stocks of capital/wealth as well as on capital 
income. As reviewed in chapter 2 the effects of capital income taxes and wealth taxes, 
such as property taxes, vary considerably. Hence, in order to assess the impact the 
observed changes in capital taxation might have on growth, it is important to analyse the 
two categories separately. 
4.3.2.1.  Taxes on stocks of capital/wealth 
Taxes on stocks of capital/wealth, which account for about 1/3 of capital taxes, have 
been rather stable over the observation period. The significantly reduced shares of 
capital/wealth in Latvia and Luxembourg are rather due to the cycle than to policy 
measures, as the biggest reduction was observed in 2008. The sharp increase in the 
United Kingdoms' capital tax share was due to the introduction of capital levies, forming 
part of taxes on the stock of wealth. Unfortunately, data does not allow an in depth 
assessment of the development of property tax shares. 
4.3.2.2.  Taxes on corporate income 
Given the relative stability of taxes on capital stocks, the changes in the capital tax share 
can be largely attributed to changes in the share of capital taxes on corporations, 
amounting to on average one third of overall capital taxation. The majority of EU 
Member States decreased their (top) statutory tax rates on corporate income between 
2001 and 2008, which resulted in the fall of the average EU-27 statutory rate by 7.1 
 
60 These three countries still experience a sizable decrease in the capital tax share, when the boom year 
2007 instead of 2008 is considered as the reference year. 31 
 
                                                
percentage points to 23.6%. Nevertheless, the EU-average corporate tax share in total 
taxation increased over the observation period. Among those countries displaying the 
highest increase in capital tax shares, Malta and the United Kingdom did not decrease 
their statutory tax rates. Germany only decreased it in 2008, which due to collection lags 
might not be visible in the 2008 data; Slovenia decreased the tax rate on corporate 
income slightly. At the same time these countries experienced a significant increase in 
the capital tax base, namely corporate profits (proxied by the net operating surplus), in 
GDP. Ceteris paribus a more important tax base in % of GDP should lead to a higher tax 
share. This increase in the tax base is indeed the reason for a sizeable increase in the 
corporate tax share in all countries, but the United Kingdom. The decrease in the capital 
tax share experienced by the Netherlands, driven by the decrease in the corporate tax 
share, was due the large cut in corporate tax rates rather than a fall in the tax base. Only 
in Greece, rate cuts were accompanied by a fall in the tax base, resulting in a slump in 
the share of corporate taxation Lithuania stands out as a country with an increasing 
corporation tax share despite a significant rate cut and slight decrease in the net operating 
surplus in % of GDP. This shift in the tax share is mainly due to higher revenues accrued 
by a broadening of the base, taxes are actually levied on
61 . 
Overall, it seems that while taxes on stock of capital / wealth – among which property 
taxes – remained rather stable, corporate taxes showed considerable increases causing the 
observed developments in capital taxation shares. 
4.3.3.  Taxation on consumption 
The share of consumption taxes in total taxation, which according to tax-efficiency 
theory should be relatively high, increased in twelve Member States. Similar to labour 
tax shares, the Member States experiencing the most significant increases were those 
already gaining the largest shares of their tax revenues from consumption taxes. 
Bulgaria, that levied already the EU-wide highest share of total taxation (41.6%) on 
consumption in 2001, increased this share by a further twelve percentage points till 2008. 
Poland, Rumania (both + 3 pp), Cyprus and Slovakia (+2.6 pp and 2.5 pp, respectively) 
showed a similar development. The only old Member State displaying a similar change 
in consumption tax shares is Sweden; in contrast to the mentioned new Member States 
starting from below EU average. Such, countries already heavily relying on consumption 
taxes have increased this share further, while most of the old Member States have 
decreased their already low shares. Starting from at or below average in 2001, Italy and 
 
61 The base a country levies corporate taxes on might actually differ from the broad definition of a tax base 
proxied by net operating surplus due to the existence of tax credits, tax allowances, depreciation rules 
etc. 32 
 
Spain saw a decrease in consumption tax shares by -2.1 percentage points and -3.2 
percentage points respectively. 
Drivers of the above mentioned observations can be value added taxes, which amount for 
the largest part of consumption taxes, excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco and excise 
duties on energy products. An increase in the VAT rate of five percentage points serves 
as an explanation of the increase in the consumption tax share in Cyprus. Slovakia 
decreased its standard VAT rate by four percentage points and still experienced an 
increase in the consumption tax share. For the other countries no significant changes to 
the VAT rates or bases could be detected – Bulgaria and Romania even introduced 
reduced rates, and saw their tax base, namely final consumption expenditure slightly 
decrease. However, excise duties on alcohol, tobacco and energy products in new 
Member States were increased – sometimes considerably – to meet the EU minimum 
requirements. Additionally, an improved implementation of tax law including the fight of 
tax evasion and avoidance might have driven the increase in the respective consumption 
tax shares. Moreover, the decrease in tax revenue in one tax area, e.g. in labour taxation, 
increases ceteris paribus the other tax shares, i.e. of consumption and/or capital. This 
reinforced the tax shift in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, characterised by an increase in 
consumption tax to GDP ratio as well as falling labour taxation in % of GDP. Large 
changes in labour taxation relative to consumption taxation in % of GDP were the 
driving forces for the changes observed in Sweden, Slovakia, Italy and Spain, as can be 
derived from Graph 5.  
4.3.4.  Environmental taxation 
The share of environmental taxes in total taxation decreased on average in the EU-27 
countries, driven by the decrease in 19 Member States. The only significant increases 
were recorded in Bulgaria, Denmark and Poland and Slovakia. The development of 
environmental taxation is in most countries driven by the development of energy taxes, 
which amount to 70% of environment taxation on the EU average. However, a decrease 
in the environmental tax share, and in particular in the energy tax share, does not 
necessarily indicate that environmental issues are not high on the policy agenda. If 
environmental taxes are effective they should reduce the use of environmentally harmful 
goods and hence erode the tax base. Indeed, between 2001 and 2008 final energy 
consumption, which is the proxy of the tax base for energy taxes, increased at a much 
slower pace than the tax bases for the other taxes analysed above. 33 
 
                                                
A look at the deflated implicit tax rate (ITR) on energy 
62 
63– setting energy tax revenues 
in perspective with final energy consumption - confirms that the real ITR on energy has 
increased in almost all new Member States, and only decreased in 11 – mostly EU-15 – 
Member States. The decrease in the ITR in these Member States can be directly linked to 
lower taxation in real terms despite unchanged nominal rates. In difference to other taxes, 
excise duties on energy products are levied on measures per unit and are not indexed to 
inflation, so their real value decreases over time. The increase in the EU-12 was mostly 
driven by the need to achieve the EU-minimum rates (as explained above) by 2010.  
The overall decrease of environmental taxation in % of GDP might not only be due to the 
reduction of the tax base as % of GDP and the real devaluation of energy taxation. The 
decreasing share in environmental taxation might also be due to a change in policy 
instruments. As pointed out in section 4.2, it has become widespread to levy fees instead 
of lump-sum taxes such as road pricing, fees on waste disposal, etc. This of course 
impacts on the tax share and the respective changes observed. However, neither 
increasing nor decreasing tax shares can guarantee that corresponding climate objectives 
have been achieved – this has to be assessed separately. 
4.3.5.  Assessment of all tax categories – was there a tax shift before the 
crisis? 
After having assessed the reason of shifts in individual tax categories, this section looks 
at all categories together. It assesses to which degree the observed overall tax shifts have 
been in line with the suggestions in the literature and identifies the respective countries. 
As mentioned above, the literature considers a shift from capital and labour income 
taxation to consumption, property and environmental taxation as supportive for growth. 
The EU-12 average tax shift shows a decrease in labour taxes (-3.4pp), an increase in 
consumption taxes (+1.8 pp) as well as a slight increase in capital taxation, which is 
more or less in line with the literature. In contrast, the EU-15 Member States observed a 
decrease in both, labour and consumption taxes (-0.5 and -1.0 pp respectively) together 
with increasing capital taxation  
In detail, eight Member States, namely Bulgaria, Germany, Cyprus, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden experienced a decrease in labour taxes together with an 
 
62 The ITR on energy shows the amount of energy tax, in Euro, levied per unit of final energy 
consumption. 
63 See Table A5.1 in the Annex. 34 
 
                                                
increase in consumption taxes.
64 However, only Bulgaria saw their capital tax share 
decreased at the same time. The decrease in capital taxation in Bulgaria was caused by 
the fall in taxes on income of corporations, which is reflecting the reduction of the top 
statutory corporate income tax rate from 28% in 2001 to 10% in 2008. Hence, Bulgaria is 
indeed shifting its tax system towards one which is said to be supportive for growth. In 
the above group, the all new Member States but Slovenia started their tax shifts from an 
above average share of consumption and a below average share of labour taxes. So the 
tax shifts further increased their dependency on consumption taxes as compared to labour 
taxes. Their average consumption tax share increased by 3.5 percentage points and now 
stands at 39% of total taxation – 11 percentage points above EU-27 average. Their labour 
tax share decreased by an average of six percentage points amounting to 39% of total 
taxation as compared to an average EU-27 labour tax share of 50%. 
Only Sweden and Germany decreased their above average labour tax shares by almost 5 
percentage points to 56% of total taxation while increasing their below average 
consumption tax shares by one percentage point to 27% of total taxation. These 
developments were obviously bringing Germany and Sweden more in line with EU 
average while the five new Member States, referred to above, deviated further from the 
EU-27 average. 
This analysis shows that sizable shifts from labour towards consumption taxation were 
mostly performed by countries already relying heavily on consumption taxes. While the 
literature is silent about an optimal share of consumption taxes the marginal benefit of a 
shift towards consumption taxes might be higher for those countries with high labour 
taxation. However this shift could not be observed over the last eight years before the 
beginning of the financial and economic crisis. 
5.  HAS THE CRISIS BEEN USED TO MOVE TOWARDS 'HIGH QUALITY' TAX SYSTEMS? 
The previous chapter assessed tax shifts as observed in the data, grouped the findings and 
presented possible causes for the observed developments. This approach cannot be 
applied for assessing the shifts during and after the crisis, as detailed data which enables 
an attribution of taxes to the economic functions consumption, labour, capital and 
environment is not yet available.
65 Moreover, the observed shifts in the 2008-2011 
period might be considerably driven by the economic and financial crises. Hence, the 
actually observed tax revenue developments and tax shifts are substantially influenced by 
 
64 While sensitivity tests (see Annex) come to similar results, the exact degree to which these shifts reflect 
policy changes or just the effect of cyclical developments requires further analysis, as provided in the 
subsections 4.3.1-4.3.4. 
65 Detailed data is usually available with a lag of 1.5 years.  35 
 
                                                
the cyclical situation; i.e. factors outside the decision makers' sphere of (direct) 
influence. Usually, in an unfavourable economic climate (company) profits fall much 
faster and more pronounced than labour and consumption. Accordingly, capital taxes and 
in particular corporate taxes should decrease more than labour and consumption taxes, 
resulting in an observed tax shift. To avoid giving a misleading picture, either years of 
similar economic activity should be compared – as it was done in the previous chapter – 
or tax measures in individual countries have to be assessed in detail. The latter approach 
is followed with respect to the 2008-2011 period. 
Information on recent policy operations (2008-2011), taken since the beginning of the 
financial and economic crisis, allow the following observations:
 66 
5.1.  Taxes on labour 
5.1.1.  Personal income taxation 
In the field of taxation on labour policy reactions at the beginning of the crisis were 
characterised by reductions in the tax base mostly through increasing allowances, and tax 
credits for personal income taxation. In addition, some countries introduced major 
income tax reforms in 2009 such as Austria, Hungary, Latvia (temporarily), Lithuania 
and Poland to reduce the income tax burden, sometimes going hand in hand with major 
rate cuts such as in Poland and Lithuania. The few cases of increases in PIT rates were 
almost exclusively restricted to high incomes. 
From 2010 onwards policy measures concerning labour taxation were more 
heterogeneous among Member States. While most countries have increased their tax 
bases (such as Austria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, France, Greece, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom) some have 
also increased their statutory tax rates. Top personal income tax rates were increased 
most significantly in the United Kingdom (+10pp), Greece (+5pp), Portugal (+4.5pp), 
Luxembourg (+3.1pp) and Spain (+2pp). The resulting increases in both, tax rate and tax 
bases, were, hence, largely reversing previous decreases. 
Several Member States have lowered personal income taxes (Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Sweden), mostly though 
increased allowances and tax credits. Decreases in personal income tax rates have largely 
been targeted to low incomes (or disfavoured groups (Germany, Netherlands)) just like 
many of the decreases in the tax bases. An exception to this targeted measures are the 
general personal income tax rate decreases in Finland, Denmark and Hungary. Hungary 
 
66 Information on tax measures stems from European Commission (2010b and 2011b) as well as the IBFD 
(2011). 36 
 
                                                
introduced a flat rate tax system with a rate of 16% in 2011 compared to the previous 
40.6% top marginal income tax rate.
67 In Denmark, the 2010 reform revised tax brackets 
and decreased the lowest and, in particular, the highest marginal tax rate from 59.0% to 
51.5%. Finland decreased the income tax rates by 0.5 percentage points across all income 
tax brackets. 
5.1.2.  Social Security Contributions 
Apart from automatic adjustments, changes in the social security system were rather 
limited both with respect to rates as well as with respect to the bases at the beginning of 
the crisis. However, in particular since 2011, social security contribution bases but also 
the contribution rates have almost exclusively been increased; also in those countries that 
engaged in labour tax rate cuts. Moreover, in some countries obligatory pension 
payments to private pension funds have been redirected towards the state social security 
system. While not effectively changing the tax burden on labour, this results in a purely 
statistical increase in social security contributions to the state (Hungary, Poland and 
Romania). 
Wile the economic situation in 2008 and 2009 clearly resulted in a decrease in the tax 
burden on labour, the following years marked differences across Member States as 
regards the direction of tax changes. Overall, a slight increase in the tax burden on labour 
might be concluded. The most significant changes (increases as well as decreases) are 
mainly observed in Member States with a below average tax burden on labour, with the 
exception of Hungary and Denmark, which have decreased the labour tax burden starting 
from an above average position. 
5.2.  Taxes on capital 
5.2.1.  Corporate income taxation 
Since the beginning of the crisis corporate income tax rates have not been used as an 
active policy instrument, as opposed to labour taxation or VAT rates.. However, the 
crisis seems to have stopped the long lasting trend of lowering CIT rates in the EU 
Member States. Since the beginning of the decade the average decrease in the EU 
average top statutory CIT rate amounted to more than one percentage point per year. In 
contrast to that, since 2008 the overall decrease until 2011 amounted to less than 0.5 
percentage points, i.e. a decrease of 0.15 percentage points per year. 
 
67 Several surcharges (e.g. the solidarity surcharge of 4%) however increase the top marginal tax rate to 
20.3%. The top personal income tax rate of 40.6% also includes the solidarity tax. 37 
 
Also the number of countries engaging in CIT rate changes has been considerably less 
than those changing personal income tax rates. Nine Member States changed their top 
statutory CIT rates over the 2008-2011 period, among which Lithuania that increased the 
rate in 2009 but cut it back to its previous level in the following year. From the 
remaining countries, three decreased their CIT rates from below average rates further, 
namely Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia. Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom decreased their rates from above average levels. Some 
Member States such as Italy increased taxes falling on corporate profits (Robin Hood 
tax) or introduced (progressive) surcharges on high profits such as Portugal, Greece and 
Hungary on specific sectors. 
In contrast to CIT rates, the CIT base was clearly used to cushion the effects of the crisis. 
Almost all countries introduced (temporary) special tax regimes, by which the tax base 
was reduced. Member States attempted to support business activities through 
investment/environmental tax credits and tax allowances (e.g. Belgium, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia) more generous depreciation 
allowances (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal) or extended payment obligations 
(Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia). Some of these measures were targeted towards 
SMEs (Germany, France, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, UK) such as profit exemptions, 
rate cuts or taxation of turnover at lower rates instead of the taxation of corporate profits. 
5.2.2.  Financial Sector Taxation 
The belief that those who have caused the crisis and benefited from substantial 
government support should make a fair contribution to its costs has led to augmented 
taxation of capital, in particular of the financial sector. Ten Member States, namely 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, have or are about to introduce some form of taxes on the financial 
sector. These levies differ considerably with respect to the exact base, the rate, the timing 
(temporary versus permanent) as well as the scope. For example in Austria, Hungary, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom, financial sector taxation is implemented as a bank 
levy based on the balance sheet total (excluding own capital and secured deposits). 
From an EU-wide perspective these different schemes could lead to double "taxation", in 
case branches of foreign banks are taxed in the branch jurisdiction and also in the home 
jurisdiction. Moreover, given that some countries will not introduce such taxes, they 
might become an important factor in the decision where to install the corporate 38 
 
                                                
headquarters of a financial institution. Both, double taxation as well as non-taxation can 
cause competitive distortions within the Internal Market.
68 
5.2.3.  Property taxes and other taxes on capital 
Other taxes on capital recently coming into force include taxes on speculative gains in 
Austria and France and the taxation of church property and inheritances in Greece. 
Hungary introduced special taxes on retail trade activities (the special retail tax), on 
telecommunication activities and on the activities of energy providers (the special energy 
tax). However taxes on immovable property have stayed generally unchanged, with the 
exception of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece (church property and progressive taxation 
on high value real estate), Portugal and parts of Germany. 
Summing up, major changes in the taxation of capital were restricted to the introduction 
of bank levies in several Member States. However, having in mind the long-standing 
trend to decrease capital and in particular corporate taxation, this no-change policy since 
the beginning of the crisis might reflect a turning point in capital taxation. 
5.3.  Taxes on consumption 
5.3.1.  VAT 
At the beginning of the crisis in 2008, Member States tried to cushion its effects by 
changes in the tax base. In particular in 2008 and 2009 a number of measures narrowing 
the tax base of the standard VAT, by applying reduced rates to more goods and services, 
were introduced. These measures were intended to boost demand for e.g. tourism, 
restaurant services and housing construction and renovation in countries like Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania and 
Finland (in 2010). Only Portugal (2008) and the United Kingdom (2009) decreased 
temporarily their standard VAT rates. 
Given the consolidation needs in many Member States, in particular from 2009 onwards 
Member States have started using the VAT rates as a policy instrument to raise revenues. 
Over the entire period 2008-2011 14 Member States increased their standard VAT rates 
at least once, and only in Ireland this increase was reversed in the following year. 
Reduced VAT rates were still increased in ten Member States. These increases in the 
standard VAT rates in individual Member States translate into an increase in the 
weighted EU average VAT rate by 1.3 percentage points to 20.7%. 
 
68 See KPMG (2011) for tax measures in the financial sector and Monti (2010) for considerations on the 
Internal Market 39 
 
                                                
However, this increase underestimates the significant size of the rate hikes in individual 
Member States because large Member States like Germany, France and Italy did not 
change their rates. In the six old Member States that increased their tax rates (Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Finland, UK, Ireland (temporarily in 2009)) the average tax rate hike 
was two percentage points. Eight new Member States (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania) hiked VAT rates by three 
percentage points on average. 
The most sizeable individual increases took place in Hungary and Romania, which 
increased their standard VAT rates by 5 percentage points and in Greece, which 
increased the standard VAT rate by 4 percentage points. 
It is interesting to note that four countries in the quartile of countries with the highest 
shares of consumption taxes in overall taxation increased their VAT rates (Estonia, 
Latvia, Poland and Romania). In contrast, only one country (Spain) in the quartile of the 
those with the lowest consumption tax burden hiked VAT rates. Ceteris paribus, this 
leads to a further reliance on consumption taxes of countries, which already rely heavily 
on them and hence more divergence in the in the tax structure between Member States. 
5.3.2.  Excise duties 
The second important category in consumption taxes are excise duties, accounting for 
about 20% of consumption taxes. During 2008-2011 almost all Member States increased 
excise duties, in particular those on energy products but also, albeit to a lesser extent, 
those on alcohol and tobacco. At the beginning of the observation period mostly new 
Member States increased the rates – partly driven by the need to reach EU-minima levels 
on energy taxation by 2010. Since 2010 an increasing number of old Member States have 
joined the hike in excise duties, for revenue, environment or health reasons.  
The need to bring public finances back to a sustainable path has also led to the 
introduction of new taxes in several Member States. Among the taxes that fall as excise 
duties on consumption are the nuclear energy tax in Germany and the taxes on airline 
tickets in Germany and Austria or emission taxes in Slovakia.
69 
Overall, the tax burden on consumption has been clearly increasing since the beginning 
of the crisis, both with respect to the bases as well with respect to rates. The increase in 
consumption taxation is strongest in EU Member States that already rely heavily on 
consumption taxation, increasing tax systems’ heterogeneity. 
 
69 The Netherlands abolished the tax on flight tickets in 2009. 40 
 
                                                
5.4.  Environmental taxes 
As explained above, in the majority of Member States environmental taxes are 
dominated by energy taxes. These taxes are basically comprised by excise duties on the 
use of energy products just as fuels, gas and electricity. As excise duties have been raised 
in almost every Member States, energy taxes and hence environmental taxes have been 
increased since 2008. Moreover, some countries have introduced new environmental 
taxes. Germany introduced a nuclear energy tax, and Austria and Germany introduced 
taxes on airline tickets, while Slovakia introduced a tax on ETS quotas allocated free of 
charge.
70. 
Changes took also place in the field of transport taxation, in particular in the field of car 
taxation. Member States such as Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands linked the tax rate 
(Austria, Belgium) or the tax base (Netherlands) closer to CO2 emissions to better reflect 
the damage caused to the environment by these emissions. 
5.5.  Any tax shifts since the beginning of the crisis? 
The distress that the financial and economic crisis inflicted on government budgets has 
clearly marked fiscal policy since the crisis. In line with the European Economic 
Recovery Programme the first two years were characterised by tax measures to stabilise 
the economy. These measures took mostly the form of changes in the tax base, by 
granting more generous allowances, tax credits and narrowing the tax base of the 
standard VAT, or allowing for more generous tax payment delays. The above assessment 
of measures in individual tax categories, however, does not point towards a significant 
shift towards certain tax categories.  
The latter years were characterised by consolidation needs. Indeed, the majority of the 
EU Member States have increased taxes in a wide range of categories, resulting in an 
increase in the tax burden. For capital and labour taxes, measures to broaden the tax base 
were prevalent, thus reversing earlier base narrowing measures. Tax rates were mostly 
increased for high incomes, while reductions were generally targeted to vulnerable 
groups. The tax burden on consumption and environmental taxation has been clearly 
increasing since the beginning of the crisis, both with respect to the bases but most 
frequently with respect to rates.  
Given the general increase in consumption and environmental taxation in most Member 
States, a modest shift in the composition of the overall tax burden from labour and 
capital towards consumption taxation and environmental has taken place. However, the 
increase in consumption and environmental taxation was in general not accompanied by 
 
70 The decision if these taxes will be classified as environmental taxes in line with the definition currently 
applied in European Commission (2011b) is pending. 41 
 
cuts in more distortive taxation on capital and labour, but also these categories taxes 
faced tax increased and the (uncoordinated) introduction of new taxes such as the bank 
levy, resulting in an increase in the overall tax burden. Hence, the overall tax shift is in 
general observed against a background of an increasing tax burden. The exceptions are 
clearly Hungary, which decreased the tax rate on labour while increasing the VAT rate 
and, albeit to a lesser extent, Denmark, Finland, and Lithuania. Germany and the 
Netherlands restructured their tax mixes slightly by decreasing the tax burden on capital 
and labour by mostly tax base measures. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
As tax policies pursue many policy objectives, the topic quality of taxation covers many 
dimensions, economic growth being one of them. Given that economic growth is usually 
considered as a precondition for the general improvement of living conditions, the focus 
of the discussion on quality of taxation in this paper was on tax effects on GDP and on 
long-term and sustainable growth. 
Economic theory links taxation to growth through its influence on the decisions of 
economic agents. Taxation – at least theoretically – changes economic decisions and can 
thereby affect economic growth. Considering a simple production function it is obvious 
that taxation can affect GDP and economic growth through its impact on i) physical 
capital ii) human capital and iii) through its effect on the total factor productivity. The 
theoretical effects of taxation on economic behaviour have been reviewed for the tax 
categories labour, consumption, capital and environment.  
The provided theoretical arguments have been put into perspective with empirical 
research on the growth friendliness of tax categories. Certain findings indicate that 
corporate and personal income taxes are the most detrimental to growth, while 
consumption, environment and property taxes are least harmful. In particular, the 
reviewed simulation results indicate that smart consolidation of budgets – i.e. increasing 
the right taxes such as consumption taxes – might actually increase long term GDP, 
provided that the increased room for fiscal policy is used to cut labour taxation later on. 
Based on this research the paper investigated whether over the recent past, i.e. 2001-
2008, shifts towards tax systems that are supposedly less detrimental to growth could be 
observed in the EU. Overall, the average EU-27  tax mix has basically remained 
unchanged. Comparing developments in old and new Member States, however, shows 
that developments in the EU-12 seem to be largely in line with suggestions from the 
literature with decreasing labour tax shares and increasing consumption tax shares. In 
contrast, EU-15 Member States have experienced changes opposite to suggestions in the 
literature with an increasing capital tax share – due to increase corporate tax revenues – 
and a decreasing consumption tax share. 42 
 
Sizable shifts from labour towards consumption taxation were mostly performed by new 
Member States, in particular by those already relying heavily on consumption taxes. As 
EU-15 Member Sates have not acted likewise, this has further increased divergence in 
EU Member States' tax systems. While it is not in the scope of the paper to investigate if 
there is a threshold above which a single tax category becomes too dominant to assure a 
'growth enhancing' tax mix or if heterogeneity in tax systems is good or bad for the EU as 
a whole, it is certainly an interesting research question for future work. 
The paper also analysed the question if the economic and financial crisis has triggered a 
rethinking and restructuring of tax systems towards growth enhancing structures. Tax 
policy at the beginning of the crisis was characterised by tax reductions in all tax 
categories to support the economy. These measures took mostly the form of changes in 
the tax base, by granting more generous allowances, tax credits and narrowing the tax 
base of the standard taxes, or granting tax payment extensions. Due to consolidation 
needs, the latter years have been dominated by tax increasing measures. Given the 
general increase in consumption taxation in most Member States and the heterogeneous 
measures concerning labour taxation, a modest shift in the composition of the overall tax 
burden from labour and capital towards consumption and environmental taxation has 
taken place in the EU. However, this shift materializes against a background of an 
increasing overall tax burden. 43 
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 Table A1: Total Taxes (including SSC) as % of GDP
Ranking
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009
BE 43.9 44.4 45.0 45.5 45.5 45.2 45.2 45.3 44.8 44.9 44.9 44.5 44.0 44.4 43.5 3
BG 30.8 28.6 27.6 32.1 30.8 31.5 30.8 28.5 31.0 32.5 31.3 30.7 33.3 32.3 28.9 23
CZ 36.2 34.7 35.0 33.3 34.0 33.8 34.0 34.8 35.7 37.4 37.1 36.7 37.2 35.5 34.5 16
DK 48.8 49.2 48.9 49.3 50.1 49.4 48.5 47.9 48.0 49.0 50.8 49.6 48.9 48.1 48.1 1
DE 39.8 40.7 40.7 40.9 41.7 41.9 40.0 39.5 39.6 38.7 38.8 39.1 39.3 39.4 39.7 8
EE 34.8 33.5 34.4 34.3 32.5 31.0 30.2 31.0 30.8 30.6 30.6 30.7 31.9 32.1 35.9 13
IE 33.1 33.1 32.4 31.7 31.9 31.5 29.7 28.4 28.9 30.2 30.7 32.2 31.4 29.7 28.2 25
EL 29.1 29.4 30.6 32.5 33.4 34.6 33.2 33.7 32.1 31.3 31.9 31.5 32.1 31.7 30.3 21
ES 32.7 33.1 33.2 33.0 33.6 33.9 33.5 33.9 33.9 34.5 35.6 36.4 37.1 33.2 30.4 20
FR 42.7 43.9 44.1 44.0 44.9 44.1 43.8 43.1 42.9 43.2 43.6 43.9 43.2 42.9 41.6 7
IT 40.1 41.8 43.7 42.5 42.5 41.8 41.5 40.9 41.3 40.6 40.4 42.0 43.0 42.9 43.1 4
CY 26.7 26.2 25.6 27.7 28.0 30.0 30.9 31.2 33.0 33.4 35.5 36.5 40.9 39.1 35.1 14
LV 33.2 30.8 32.1 33.7 32.0 29.5 28.5 28.3 28.5 28.5 29.0 30.4 30.5 29.1 26.6 27
LT 27.5 27.1 30.6 31.7 31.7 30.1 28.6 28.4 28.1 28.3 28.5 29.4 29.7 30.2 29.3 22
LU 37.1 37.6 39.3 39.4 38.3 39.1 39.8 39.3 38.1 37.3 37.6 35.9 35.7 35.3 37.1 12
HU 40.8 39.3 37.8 37.6 38.3 39.0 38.2 37.8 37.8 37.4 37.5 37.3 39.9 40.0 39.5 9
MT 26.8 25.4 27.5 25.6 27.3 28.2 30.4 31.5 31.4 32.9 33.7 33.4 34.3 33.9 34.2 17
NL 40.2 40.2 39.7 39.4 40.4 39.9 38.3 37.7 37.4 37.5 37.6 39.0 38.7 39.1 38.2 10
AT 41.4 42.9 44.4 44.4 44.0 43.2 45.3 43.9 43.8 43.4 42.3 41.8 42.0 42.6 42.7 6
PL 37.1 37.2 36.5 35.4 34.9 32.6 32.2 32.7 32.2 31.5 32.8 33.8 34.8 34.3 31.8 18
PT 29.5 30.2 30.2 30.3 31.0 31.1 30.9 31.5 31.7 30.6 31.5 32.3 32.9 32.8 31.0 19
RO 27.5 25.9 26.4 29.0 31.0 30.2 28.6 28.1 27.7 27.2 27.8 28.5 29.0 28.0 27.0 26
SI 39.2 38.1 37.0 37.8 38.2 37.5 37.7 38.0 38.2 38.3 38.6 38.3 37.8 37.2 37.6 11
SK 40.3 39.4 37.3 36.7 35.4 34.1 33.1 33.0 32.9 31.5 31.3 29.2 29.3 29.2 28.8 24
FI 45.7 47.1 46.4 46.3 45.9 47.2 44.8 44.7 44.1 43.5 43.9 43.8 43.0 43.1 43.1 5
SE 47.9 50.3 50.7 51.2 51.5 51.5 49.5 47.5 47.8 48.1 48.9 48.3 47.3 46.5 46.9 2
UK 34.7 34.4 34.8 35.9 36.2 36.7 36.4 34.9 34.7 35.1 36.0 36.7 36.3 37.5 34.9 15  
Source: European Commission (2011b) 
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 Table A2: Taxes on Labour as % of Total Taxation
Ranking
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009
BE 55.4 54.4 54.3 53.8 53.5 53.6 54.7 54.8 54.8 53.4 52.9 51.8 52.3 53.1 54.6 9
BG 42.7 40.9 42.1 40.7 44.2 44.9 41.2 42.5 41.6 39.2 37.8 33.4 31.6 30.5 34.2 26
CZ 48.2 50.0 50.7 51.4 49.7 50.5 50.1 51.2 50.7 50.8 51.4 51.9 51.4 52.5 50.7 15
DK 55.9 55.5 55.0 53.3 53.8 53.9 55.6 54.5 54.1 51.4 48.8 49.6 51.0 53.1 56.5 4
DE 60.4 59.8 60.4 59.6 58.1 58.6 60.6 61.1 60.7 59.6 58.3 56.5 54.4 55.7 57.2 2
EE 56.3 55.4 53.6 54.9 57.2 56.4 56.0 55.0 54.3 53.6 50.2 49.9 50.8 55.2 52.1 10
IE 40.9 39.8 39.2 38.0 37.0 36.3 37.0 35.2 33.7 34.4 33.8 32.5 34.2 38.0 41.7 21
EL 36.1 37.0 37.4 37.1 36.5 35.9 36.8 38.9 40.7 40.4 40.6 39.6 40.3 41.0 41.2 22
ES 49.4 49.8 48.4 48.0 46.5 46.7 48.5 48.2 47.8 46.5 45.5 44.9 45.7 51.8 55.0 6
FR 53.2 52.2 51.9 51.7 51.6 52.0 52.2 52.7 53.4 52.9 52.8 52.1 52.0 52.6 54.9 7
IT 45.5 47.6 47.7 49.0 47.9 47.6 48.7 49.5 49.2 49.6 50.5 48.8 48.7 50.5 51.2 14
CY 37.0 36.0 38.0 36.3 34.6 31.5 32.1 31.9 32.3 31.5 31.8 30.4 26.4 28.2 34.8 25
LV 52.0 51.6 49.7 48.5 50.3 51.6 51.1 51.8 51.4 50.8 48.1 47.9 48.0 49.9 51.7 12
LT 46.8 48.9 48.6 50.2 52.6 54.1 53.9 52.4 51.9 52.0 50.7 49.8 49.0 49.3 51.4 13
LU 41.8 41.5 40.2 38.8 39.4 39.0 40.3 39.1 40.1 41.0 40.9 41.3 41.7 43.2 44.3 17
HU 49.8 49.5 51.4 50.5 48.8 48.7 49.8 50.3 48.8 47.8 48.9 49.2 49.8 51.5 49.9 16
MT 33.9 34.8 35.4 34.9 34.5 34.5 35.3 32.4 32.8 31.9 30.3 30.2 28.3 27.6 28.7 27
NL 54.5 51.8 50.3 50.1 50.5 51.2 47.0 48.7 50.3 49.6 48.5 50.3 50.3 51.8 54.8 8
AT 57.2 55.6 55.7 55.3 56.0 55.6 53.8 55.2 55.7 55.1 55.4 55.8 55.3 55.8 56.7 3
PL 45.9 46.1 46.4 47.6 45.0 43.7 44.8 41.1 41.1 39.7 39.1 39.6 37.4 38.1 38.2 24
PT 38.2 37.2 37.0 36.4 36.3 37.3 38.6 38.0 38.6 38.9 38.6 38.3 38.2 38.6 42.0 20
RO 43.0 43.8 38.6 41.7 41.8 43.8 44.9 43.9 40.1 39.4 39.6 40.6 40.8 41.2 44.0 18
SI 56.3 54.5 55.0 54.0 53.1 55.2 55.8 54.8 54.7 54.4 53.4 52.8 50.8 51.9 52.0 11
SK 38.2 41.9 44.4 44.5 43.8 44.1 45.5 45.3 43.8 42.1 40.0 39.5 39.6 42.3 43.5 19
FI 57.1 57.0 53.4 52.4 51.7 50.2 53.0 52.9 52.9 52.3 52.7 52.6 51.8 53.3 55.2 5
SE 62.1 62.5 61.8 62.5 61.4 59.7 62.3 62.5 62.6 61.5 59.5 58.8 57.6 59.7 58.5 1
UK 39.6 37.8 36.7 37.4 37.7 38.5 38.9 38.5 39.0 39.0 39.7 38.9 39.6 38.0 40.3 23
Source: European Commission (2011b) 
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Table A3: Taxes on Capital as % of Total Taxation
Ranking
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009
BE 19.8 20.1 20.5 21.6 21.0 21.1 20.8 20.6 20.4 21.5 22.0 22.8 22.6 22.5 20.6 12
BG 17.9 20.4 20.5 15.6 14.8 13.3 17.1 15.9 13.9 13.1 11.4 12.5 18.9 16.1 14.8 18
CZ 20.3 17.5 18.5 18.0 18.7 18.2 19.8 19.8 20.2 19.2 18.3 19.0 19.3 17.2 16.8 15
DK 13.0 12.8 13.0 14.0 13.8 14.6 12.4 12.8 13.7 16.7 19.8 17.9 16.3 14.9 12.2 22
DE 13.7 15.2 15.0 15.7 16.7 16.3 13.3 12.7 12.9 14.2 15.6 17.7 18.6 17.3 14.9 17
E E 9 . 17 . 38 . 3 1 0 . 28 . 85 . 95 . 26 . 68 . 18 . 27 . 97 . 87 . 97 . 97 . 2 2 7
IE 19.8 21.3 22.0 23.2 25.1 25.4 26.3 26.1 28.8 28.5 29.0 31.8 30.1 25.2 22.9 9
EL 22.6 21.7 22.8 25.0 26.0 28.2 25.1 24.4 23.6 23.7 24.4 23.9 23.3 23.0 23.4 8
ES 23.4 23.0 25.0 25.0 25.8 25.9 24.9 25.8 25.7 26.8 28.3 29.8 30.3 24.9 24.5 7
FR 19.4 20.2 20.9 21.5 22.0 22.4 22.9 21.6 20.9 21.5 21.7 23.0 23.3 23.0 20.3 13
IT 28.5 28.3 28.7 25.8 26.3 26.2 26.2 25.6 26.9 25.8 24.8 26.6 27.6 26.5 26.0 5
CY 24.1 25.6 25.9 30.1 32.7 33.0 29.7 28.5 23.1 23.2 25.4 27.5 34.2 31.1 27.1 4
LV 11.3 10.5 12.4 12.6 12.1 9.8 11.7 10.8 8.8 9.2 9.5 9.9 12.9 13.9 9.3 26
LT 12.6 12.0 10.3 9.0 8.1 7.7 7.0 6.9 9.1 10.9 11.6 13.5 12.8 13.1 11.1 24
LU 31.2 32.2 33.0 34.3 33.2 33.6 33.1 33.6 32.1 28.9 30.0 30.6 30.8 28.8 28.3 3
HU 8.7 9.9 10.2 10.7 11.4 11.6 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.3 12.4 13.4 13.7 12.7 12.0 23
MT 22.9 21.7 21.6 22.2 21.8 22.5 22.8 25.2 27.8 27.7 27.0 28.3 31.4 32.0 32.0 1
NL 17.5 19.7 20.7 20.5 20.0 19.6 22.0 20.4 18.2 18.4 19.7 18.3 18.4 17.6 14.4 19
AT 14.8 16.3 16.0 16.6 15.4 15.9 18.9 16.5 16.1 16.5 16.1 16.3 17.1 17.1 15.3 16
PL 20.3 19.4 20.0 19.6 20.3 22.0 21.9 23.7 22.9 23.9 24.5 24.1 26.0 24.7 25.9 6
PT 21.4 22.5 23.7 23.3 24.3 25.0 23.5 24.0 23.3 21.4 20.5 21.0 23.4 24.0 22.8 10
RO 25.5 23.3 27.3 20.8 20.9 18.1 18.0 17.2 18.2 19.7 16.2 17.1 18.5 18.7 17.6 14
S I 5 . 36 . 77 . 78 . 08 . 07 . 98 . 69 . 19 . 3 1 0 . 2 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 9 1 4 . 4 1 2 . 5 1 1 . 0 2 5
SK 26.8 24.6 21.7 21.5 22.3 20.2 21.2 21.3 20.9 19.9 20.6 22.3 22.4 21.8 20.7 11
FI 12.6 13.4 15.4 17.1 17.5 21.0 17.6 17.1 15.5 16.4 16.2 16.5 18.3 16.9 13.7 20
SE 10.1 11.7 12.9 12.2 13.8 16.3 12.5 10.9 11.1 12.7 14.7 15.6 16.2 13.0 13.0 21
UK 25.8 27.2 28.9 29.5 28.9 29.3 29.6 28.4 27.9 28.3 29.8 31.6 31.0 33.3 30.1 2  
Source: European Commission (2011b) 
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 Table A3.1: Taxes on Income of Corporations as % of Total Taxation
Ranking
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009
B E 5 . 36 . 06 . 37 . 47 . 17 . 16 . 96 . 76 . 46 . 97 . 48 . 07 . 97 . 65 . 8 1 8
BG 14.6 17.6 18.4 12.6 10.7 9.1 12.9 10.9 9.3 8.4 6.3 7.4 13.7 10.3 9.4 7
CZ 12.7 9.7 11.0 10.1 11.2 10.3 12.0 12.3 12.8 12.5 12.0 13.1 13.4 11.7 10.5 4
D K 4 . 85 . 15 . 56 . 14 . 86 . 65 . 86 . 06 . 16 . 57 . 78 . 87 . 86 . 85 . 1 2 3
D E 5 . 25 . 96 . 36 . 56 . 87 . 14 . 34 . 24 . 75 . 76 . 57 . 77 . 77 . 05 . 1 2 2
E E 6 . 74 . 65 . 17 . 16 . 02 . 92 . 33 . 65 . 15 . 44 . 74 . 95 . 25 . 15 . 2 2 1
IE 8.3 9.4 9.9 10.6 12.1 12.0 12.1 13.1 13.1 12.2 11.4 12.3 11.3 9.8 8.8 9
EL 8.0 6.8 7.5 8.6 9.4 12.0 10.1 10.0 9.1 9.6 10.3 8.6 7.9 7.9 8.0 10
E S 5 . 86 . 18 . 17 . 78 . 79 . 28 . 69 . 69 . 3 1 0 . 0 1 1 . 0 1 1 . 6 1 2 . 88 . 87 . 6 1 3
F R 4 . 24 . 75 . 25 . 35 . 96 . 37 . 05 . 95 . 05 . 45 . 36 . 66 . 76 . 43 . 0 2 7
I T 7 . 18 . 08 . 66 . 67 . 66 . 98 . 97 . 78 . 67 . 67 . 18 . 39 . 28 . 78 . 0 1 2
CY 15.8 17.8 18.0 20.9 23.9 20.6 20.1 19.2 13.1 11.1 13.1 15.0 16.6 18.0 18.4 2
L V 5 . 55 . 96 . 86 . 86 . 35 . 36 . 67 . 15 . 36 . 16 . 97 . 58 . 9 1 0 . 95 . 9 1 7
L T 7 . 46 . 45 . 04 . 12 . 62 . 31 . 92 . 14 . 96 . 67 . 39 . 48 . 79 . 16 . 3 1 6
LU 17.7 18.1 19.0 19.4 17.4 17.8 18.4 20.4 19.2 15.3 15.4 13.8 14.8 14.3 14.7 3
H U 4 . 54 . 54 . 95 . 55 . 95 . 66 . 06 . 15 . 95 . 75 . 86 . 47 . 16 . 75 . 8 1 9
MT 9.8 9.0 9.5 9.7 10.0 10.3 10.6 12.3 14.5 12.6 13.3 14.8 17.7 19.8 19.7 1
NL 8.1 10.1 11.4 11.4 11.0 10.9 11.0 9.4 8.1 8.8 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 5.6 20
A T 3 . 84 . 95 . 05 . 34 . 55 . 07 . 25 . 55 . 35 . 65 . 55 . 66 . 26 . 24 . 4 2 6
P L 7 . 37 . 17 . 57 . 36 . 97 . 55 . 86 . 25 . 67 . 07 . 67 . 17 . 97 . 97 . 2 1 4
PT 7.8 8.9 10.2 10.1 11.3 12.0 10.6 10.5 8.8 9.4 8.5 9.1 10.9 11.2 9.3 8
RO 13.8 12.5 16.3 12.8 12.3 9.8 9.3 9.3 10.1 11.6 9.8 10.0 10.5 10.7 9.7 5
S I 1 . 32 . 42 . 82 . 63 . 13 . 13 . 44 . 14 . 65 . 07 . 27 . 78 . 66 . 74 . 9 2 4
SK 16.5 12.7 11.7 11.2 11.7 10.1 10.2 9.8 10.3 9.4 9.4 10.8 11.1 11.6 9.4 6
F I 5 . 06 . 07 . 59 . 49 . 4 1 2 . 59 . 49 . 37 . 78 . 17 . 67 . 79 . 08 . 14 . 7 2 5
S E 5 . 45 . 15 . 65 . 15 . 97 . 35 . 34 . 34 . 66 . 07 . 37 . 58 . 06 . 36 . 4 1 5
U K 7 . 99 . 2 1 1 . 1 1 0 . 89 . 89 . 79 . 58 . 17 . 98 . 19 . 4 1 0 . 89 . 59 . 68 . 0 1 1 
Source: European Commission (2011b) 
Table A3.2: Taxes on Stocks of capital / wealth as % of Total Taxation 
Ranking
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009
BE 6,6 6,9 7,3 7,5 7,5 7,4 7,3 7,5 7,8 8,4 8,2 8,5 8,3 8,3 8,3 3
BG 1,2 1,2 0,6 0,9 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,8 2,0 2,2 2,5 2,7 2,9 3,4 3,2 17
CZ 2,9 3,1 2,8 3,0 2,8 3,0 2,8 2,5 2,5 1,8 1,8 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,8 26
DK 3,8 3,6 3,7 4,0 4,0 4,9 5,3 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,5 5,5 5,6 6,0 6,0 9
DE 2,9 3,0 2,7 2,7 2,8 2,6 2,8 2,6 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,6 2,5 21
EE 1,6 2,0 1,9 1,9 2,0 2,1 2,0 2,0 1,8 2,0 1,9 1,7 1,7 1,9 1,7 27
IE 6,1 6,3 6,1 6,2 6,6 6,4 6,6 6,3 7,5 7,9 8,8 9,8 9,1 7,5 7,4 6
EL 5,2 5,7 6,1 5,5 6,8 6,9 5,9 4,9 4,8 4,3 4,5 5,4 5,5 5,5 5,0 11
ES 7,4 7,1 7,5 8,0 8,3 8,4 8,3 8,5 9,0 9,6 10,1 10,5 9,6 8,4 8,0 4
FR 10,0 10,2 10,5 10,8 10,5 10,3 10,2 10,1 10,2 10,6 10,7 10,6 10,8 10,4 11,0 2
IT 9,7 8,6 8,7 7,9 7,0 6,3 6,0 7,0 6,3 6,9 6,6 6,5 6,4 5,8 6,7 8
CY 5,3 5,1 5,2 5,6 5,1 8,2 5,8 4,9 5,2 7,4 7,6 6,4 8,3 6,5 4,9 13
LV 5,7 4,4 5,4 5,5 5,6 3,9 4,6 3,0 3,0 2,7 2,4 2,0 3,4 2,6 3,0 19
LT 3,2 3,6 3,2 2,8 3,1 2,9 2,6 2,5 2,3 2,4 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,7 2,3 24
LU 7,3 7,8 8,2 8,9 10,1 10,8 9,9 8,4 7,7 8,0 8,7 9,5 10,0 7,7 7,0 7
HU 1,6 2,1 2,1 2,4 2,5 2,5 2,6 2,7 3,1 3,6 3,6 3,5 3,2 3,3 3,5 16
MT 4,8 4,7 4,2 4,5 4,2 4,0 4,2 4,9 5,2 7,5 6,5 6,2 6,1 5,3 5,0 12
NL 4,6 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,7 6,0 5,7 5,9 6,1 5,3 5,4 4,9 4,7 14
AT 2,9 2,7 2,5 2,6 2,5 2,6 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,4 2,4 2,5 2,4 2,2 2,3 23
PL 5,8 5,7 5,8 5,3 4,8 5,0 5,3 5,9 5,6 5,8 5,6 5,8 5,4 5,4 5,8 10
PT 6,8 6,4 6,5 6,6 7,1 7,0 7,1 8,1 9,1 7,0 7,2 7,5 7,8 7,7 7,9 5
RO 2,3 1,1 3,6 2,0 3,5 3,9 4,2 3,9 3,7 3,2 3,1 3,6 3,9 3,6 3,6 15
SI 1,6 1,6 1,9 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,5 2,3 2,1 2,3 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,3 2,4 22
SK 2,2 3,1 2,3 2,2 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,3 2,2 2,1 2,0 2,2 25
FI 2,5 2,7 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 3,2 3,2 3,0 3,1 3,1 3,1 18
SE 3,1 4,1 4,4 4,1 4,1 4,1 3,8 3,8 3,7 3,7 3,5 3,6 3,1 2,9 3,0 20
UK 10,5 10,7 10,8 10,9 11,3 12,0 11,8 12,2 12,1 12,2 12,3 12,5 12,8 15,0 12,8 1  
Source: European Commission (2011b) 
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Table A4: Taxes on Consumption as % of Total Taxation
Ranking
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009
BE 24.4 25.1 24.8 24.2 25.1 25.0 24.1 24.2 24.3 24.5 24.7 25.1 24.7 24.0 24.4 25
BG 39.4 38.6 37.4 43.7 41.0 41.8 41.6 41.6 44.5 47.8 50.7 53.9 49.3 53.2 50.8 1
CZ 31.6 32.5 30.8 30.6 31.7 31.3 30.1 29.1 29.1 30.0 30.4 29.1 29.3 30.4 32.5 15
DK 31.6 32.2 32.4 33.1 32.7 31.8 32.3 33.0 32.5 32.3 31.8 32.8 33.0 32.2 31.6 16
DE 25.9 25.0 24.6 24.7 25.2 25.2 26.2 26.2 26.4 26.2 26.1 25.9 27.0 27.0 27.8 22
EE 34.6 37.2 38.1 34.9 34.0 37.7 38.9 38.4 37.6 38.1 41.8 42.3 41.3 36.8 40.6 2
IE 39.2 38.9 38.8 38.8 37.9 38.4 36.7 38.7 37.5 37.1 37.2 35.7 35.7 36.8 35.4 13
EL 41.3 41.3 39.8 37.9 37.4 35.9 38.1 36.7 35.7 36.0 35.0 36.5 36.4 36.0 35.5 12
ES 27.3 27.4 27.7 29.1 29.8 29.2 28.4 27.9 28.2 28.0 27.5 26.7 25.4 25.2 23.6 26
FR 28.2 28.3 27.8 27.5 27.0 26.2 25.7 26.1 26.0 26.0 25.8 25.3 25.2 25.0 25.6 24
IT 25.9 24.1 23.6 25.3 25.8 26.2 25.1 24.9 23.9 24.7 24.7 24.7 23.7 23.0 22.8 27
CY 38.9 38.4 36.1 33.6 32.7 35.5 38.2 39.6 44.6 45.4 42.8 42.2 39.4 40.7 38.1 8
LV 36.8 37.8 37.9 38.9 36.9 38.4 37.2 37.5 39.9 39.3 41.8 41.6 39.0 36.5 38.4 4
LT 40.7 39.1 41.2 40.7 40.3 39.1 40.2 41.3 39.4 37.4 37.9 36.9 38.4 37.8 38.2 6
LU 26.9 26.2 26.8 26.9 27.4 27.4 26.5 27.3 27.7 30.1 29.1 28.1 27.5 28.0 27.4 23
HU 41.5 40.6 38.4 38.8 39.8 39.7 37.9 37.2 38.7 39.8 38.7 37.4 36.5 35.9 38.1 7
MT 43.2 43.5 43.1 42.9 43.8 43.1 41.9 42.4 39.4 40.4 42.6 41.5 40.2 40.4 39.3 3
NL 28.0 28.6 29.0 29.4 29.5 29.3 31.1 30.9 31.5 31.9 31.8 31.4 31.3 30.6 30.8 18
AT 28.1 28.1 28.4 28.2 28.7 28.6 27.4 28.5 28.4 28.5 28.7 28.1 27.7 27.2 28.2 21
PL 34.2 34.9 34.1 33.3 35.2 34.8 34.5 36.2 37.0 37.4 37.6 37.3 37.1 37.6 36.2 10
PT 40.4 40.3 39.3 40.3 39.4 37.8 37.9 37.9 38.1 39.7 40.8 40.7 38.4 37.4 35.2 14
RO 31.5 32.9 34.0 37.5 37.3 38.1 37.1 38.9 41.7 40.9 44.2 42.3 40.7 40.1 38.4 5
SI 38.5 39.0 37.4 38.1 39.0 37.0 35.6 36.2 36.1 35.4 34.7 34.4 34.9 35.9 37.3 9
SK 35.0 33.5 33.9 34.0 34.0 35.7 33.2 33.4 35.3 37.9 39.4 38.2 38.1 35.8 35.9 11
FI 30.3 29.6 31.2 30.5 30.8 28.8 29.4 29.9 31.7 31.3 31.1 30.9 29.9 29.8 31.1 17
SE 27.9 25.8 25.3 25.2 24.8 24.0 25.2 26.5 26.4 25.9 25.8 25.7 26.2 27.3 28.5 20
UK 34.7 35.0 34.5 33.1 33.3 32.2 32.0 32.9 33.4 32.5 31.1 29.8 30.0 28.3 29.8 19  
Source: European Commission (2011b) 
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Table A5: Environmental taxes as % of Total Taxation
Ranking
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2009
B E 5 . 15 . 65 . 65 . 45 . 45 . 05 . 04 . 95 . 05 . 25 . 24 . 84 . 74 . 44 . 7 2 7
B G 5 . 93 . 74 . 87 . 17 . 88 . 48 . 28 . 29 . 59 . 89 . 69 . 4 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 7 1 0 . 5 1
C Z 8 . 07 . 87 . 37 . 37 . 77 . 67 . 77 . 37 . 47 . 17 . 37 . 06 . 76 . 97 . 2 1 3
DK 9.3 9.8 9.9 10.7 10.8 10.7 10.8 11.2 10.8 11.4 11.8 12.4 12.0 11.9 10.0 3
D E 5 . 85 . 45 . 35 . 25 . 55 . 76 . 36 . 46 . 76 . 56 . 36 . 15 . 75 . 65 . 7 2 3
E E 2 . 74 . 34 . 65 . 75 . 25 . 57 . 06 . 46 . 16 . 97 . 47 . 17 . 07 . 38 . 3 8
I E 9 . 29 . 49 . 39 . 49 . 39 . 17 . 98 . 38 . 18 . 38 . 27 . 77 . 98 . 48 . 4 7
E L 1 0 . 7 1 0 . 5 1 0 . 18 . 98 . 26 . 77 . 76 . 86 . 76 . 96 . 66 . 46 . 46 . 16 . 5 1 9
E S 6 . 76 . 66 . 46 . 96 . 96 . 56 . 26 . 16 . 15 . 85 . 45 . 14 . 94 . 95 . 4 2 5
F R 6 . 46 . 46 . 16 . 16 . 05 . 65 . 15 . 45 . 35 . 45 . 15 . 04 . 94 . 85 . 0 2 6
I T 8 . 88 . 27 . 87 . 88 . 07 . 47 . 16 . 97 . 16 . 86 . 76 . 46 . 05 . 76 . 1 2 1
CY 10.7 10.7 9.8 9.1 8.8 8.9 9.6 9.4 11.4 11.9 9.9 9.0 8.2 8.0 8.2 9
L V 3 . 75 . 56 . 89 . 07 . 68 . 17 . 68 . 18 . 89 . 19 . 17 . 86 . 86 . 78 . 7 6
L T 6 . 86 . 97 . 08 . 09 . 18 . 08 . 89 . 79 . 89 . 68 . 16 . 26 . 05 . 57 . 0 1 5
L U 8 . 07 . 87 . 57 . 47 . 37 . 17 . 17 . 17 . 38 . 27 . 87 . 37 . 17 . 06 . 6 1 8
H U 7 . 27 . 27 . 58 . 88 . 67 . 67 . 47 . 47 . 07 . 37 . 37 . 67 . 06 . 76 . 6 1 7
MT 11.9 12.0 12.8 15.4 14.9 13.1 12.1 10.9 10.9 9.3 9.8 10.0 10.9 10.2 9.8 4
N L 9 . 19 . 69 . 59 . 79 . 89 . 89 . 99 . 79 . 9 1 0 . 3 1 0 . 5 1 0 . 39 . 89 . 9 1 0 . 4 2
A T 5 . 25 . 05 . 45 . 25 . 35 . 65 . 86 . 16 . 36 . 36 . 26 . 05 . 85 . 65 . 7 2 4
P L 5 . 05 . 25 . 05 . 26 . 06 . 46 . 47 . 37 . 68 . 28 . 18 . 27 . 77 . 68 . 0 1 1
P T 1 1 . 5 1 1 . 4 1 0 . 7 1 1 . 2 1 0 . 58 . 59 . 39 . 79 . 59 . 89 . 48 . 98 . 67 . 88 . 1 1 0
RO 6.4 6.8 10.6 10.6 12.6 11.4 8.2 7.6 8.5 8.7 7.2 6.8 7.1 6.3 7.0 14
S I 1 0 . 8 1 1 . 5 1 2 . 2 1 3 . 4 1 0 . 97 . 98 . 68 . 68 . 78 . 78 . 37 . 98 . 08 . 19 . 5 5
S K 5 . 85 . 45 . 55 . 25 . 66 . 55 . 96 . 67 . 47 . 97 . 67 . 87 . 27 . 06 . 8 1 6
F I 6 . 46 . 67 . 27 . 27 . 56 . 66 . 66 . 87 . 27 . 47 . 06 . 96 . 46 . 36 . 2 2 0
S E 5 . 86 . 25 . 85 . 85 . 55 . 45 . 66 . 06 . 05 . 85 . 85 . 65 . 55 . 86 . 0 2 2
U K 8 . 38 . 58 . 38 . 68 . 58 . 17 . 67 . 87 . 77 . 47 . 06 . 56 . 86 . 47 . 4 1 2 
Source: European Commission (2011b) 
Table A5.1: Implicit tax rate on energy 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
BE 91.6 90.8 90.6 91.1 92.4 92.4 92.2 97.3 97.2 109.2 116.3 115.2 128.0 114.6 119.0
BG 14.7 6.5 13.0 24.7 31.5 40.6 42.9 40.4 50.5 61.6 62.7 65.7 93.1 110.0 108.4
CZ 38.7 41.4 42.0 46.0 51.9 55.2 65.3 74.1 71.9 81.1 95.9 102.5 113.6 132.6 130.8
DK 200.3 213.1 217.7 248.7 283.9 301.0 316.2 325.6 325.5 323.7 315.7 310.9 310.6 316.6 330.7
DE 168.3 151.9 149.6 150.3 177.5 192.7 200.4 211.6 221.1 214.2 209.3 206.8 209.6 203.9 215.5
EE 6.3 13.1 18.4 30.0 30.0 31.6 43.4 46.2 50.3 61.9 75.3 84.3 93.9 105.1 127.8
IE 112.2 121.1 139.5 140.4 144.7 140.7 126.7 150.4 155.0 172.4 170.8 170.8 189.2 175.2 199.2
EL 157.7 161.3 157.0 138.6 132.2 117.3 118.0 110.8 111.1 115.4 115.7 114.8 125.3 126.4 135.5
ES 128.1 134.3 128.9 138.5 144.0 137.9 134.8 143.0 141.8 141.4 140.3 146.7 148.2 148.7 157.5
FR 169.6 167.5 169.6 171.3 177.2 174.2 159.3 177.7 172.8 178.3 176.1 180.2 181.2 177.5 182.2
IT 236.3 259.1 269.6 257.8 261.8 245.8 240.4 235.9 242.2 229.6 229.2 237.4 236.4 233.1 259.6
CY 26.4 27.1 26.4 29.3 31.9 43.1 61.2 64.6 125.3 145.4 145.8 146.5 147.5 138.3 142.1
LV 10.1 18.1 26.7 44.7 41.3 48.2 43.2 48.3 51.8 60.4 71.8 75.7 82.9 92.3 96.5
LT 12.3 16.4 25.0 38.9 54.5 57.9 64.8 75.6 79.7 77.7 81.7 83.3 92.6 102.7 116.5
LU 140.9 138.6 143.0 151.2 158.8 164.4 164.3 169.7 173.9 185.7 193.7 194.6 202.8 212.3 210.1
HU 58.5 53.1 62.2 77.0 79.3 79.7 82.4 92.9 96.5 96.6 100.8 103.8 118.6 121.6 :
MT 67.5 82.4 100.9 181.4 193.2 180.8 160.5 163.4 122.1 113.6 135.5 154.1 221.3 176.0 202.4
NL 110.4 109.2 123.9 129.6 144.3 153.4 158.6 162.2 167.6 178.5 197.9 213.9 207.3 224.6 230.3
AT 122.9 116.7 136.3 129.7 135.0 141.6 146.2 151.3 151.7 163.0 155.7 155.5 165.4 170.6 171.5
PL 20.6 26.0 27.5 37.5 47.8 59.0 66.8 77.4 72.1 75.3 96.1 101.4 116.4 128.6 107.3
PT 164.6 163.5 152.5 159.4 151.4 111.8 133.4 157.7 167.7 167.4 167.5 171.7 178.2 175.0 :
RO 15.1 13.6 25.3 36.1 56.0 58.2 37.8 36.5 43.7 51.5 59.4 67.2 87.8 79.1 86.0
SI 126.2 126.0 138.9 177.7 155.5 118.6 136.3 144.9 141.8 146.1 145.4 147.7 165.9 168.4 226.8
SK 29.9 29.5 32.1 32.2 33.2 42.4 37.1 44.2 59.3 70.3 77.2 82.8 95.6 108.3 100.8
FI 96.7 96.2 106.6 104.6 109.8 108.7 112.4 113.4 112.0 112.8 115.4 111.0 110.8 124.2 129.9
SE 133.5 163.4 162.5 166.6 170.8 179.7 176.1 191.0 202.7 207.5 211.0 218.7 220.1 218.8 210.0
UK 142.6 147.8 185.7 208.2 222.3 245.8 236.6 244.2 225.6 235.5 233.8 237.6 252.6 218.7 221.1 
Source: European Commission (2011b) 
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